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INTRODUCTION
The Federal Communications Commission (FCC) recently proposed
an Internet nondiscrimination rule: "Subject to reasonable network man-
agement, a provider of broadband Internet access service must treat
lawful content, applications, and services in a nondiscriminatory man-
ner."' Among other requests, the FCC sought comment on whether the
proposed nondiscrimination rule would "promote free speech, civic par-
ticipation, and democratic engagement," and whether it would "impose
any burdens on access providers' speech that would be cognizable for
purposes of the First Amendment."2
The purpose of this Article is to suggest that a wide range of re-
sponses to these First Amendment questions, offered by
telecommunications providers and civil society groups alike, have
glossed over a fundamental question: whether the activities of broadband
Internet providers are sufficiently imbued with speech or expressive con-
duct to warrant protection under the First Amendment in the first place.
Interestingly, it is not only those who argue against governmental regula-
tion who make this threshold mistake. Those who argue for the
importance of imposing nondiscrimination and common carriage rules
upon telecommunications providers also, in their eagerness to open up a
conversation about the values of free speech in the age of the Internet,
pay little attention to this preliminary question. Yet if this question is not
resolved, any subsequent analysis of those who facilitate Internet-based
telecommunications will necessarily rest on an incoherent and insuffi-
ciently considered definition of the "speech" that is at the heart of First
Amendment concerns.
I. Preserving the Open Internet; Broadband Industry Practices, 24 FCC Rcd. 13064,
13104 para. 104 (2009) [hereinafter Open Internet NPRM] (notice of proposed rulemaking).
The FCC later sought comments on a proposed "third way" framework in which it would
classify broadband Internet service as a "telecommunications service" under Title II of the
Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. §§ 201-276 (2006), but commit to regulatory for-
bearance from several key provisions. See Framework for Broadband Internet Service, 25
FCC Red. 7866 (2010) [hereinafter Broadband Framework NOI] (notice of inquiry).
2. Open Internet NPRM, supra note 2, at 13107 para. 116.
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This Article analyzes the FCC's proposed nondiscrimination rule
with an eye towards whether the rule affects the speech or expressive
conduct of broadband providers in a manner that is cognizable for First
Amendment purposes. Discussion of the values, free speech theories,
policies, investment incentives, and economic and governmental inter-
ests underlying the resolution of this claim-values emphasized by the
vast majority of parties engaged in the network neutrality debate, at sig-
nificant cost to the clarity of constitutional elements-are deferred
pending the evaluation of this threshold question.
Part I contextualizes the currently proposed open Internet and non-
discrimination rules within the history of a series of congressional and
FCC distinctions between networks and the content and applications be-
ing carried on those networks.
To determine whether the activities of Internet connectivity provid-
ers are sufficiently imbued with speech to merit protection under the
First Amendment, Part II explores the technological architecture of the
Internet as a communications system. Given a layers-based description
of this architecture and the transmission function fulfilled by lower lay-
ers of this architecture, it is clear that broadband providers cannot and do
not, as a matter of course, exercise meaningful editorial discretion and
control over the content and applications transmitted by third parties
over their networks.
In the wake of two Supreme Court cases, PruneYard Shopping Cen-
ter v. Robins' and Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic & Institutional
Rights, Inc. , another crucial element of a "compelled speech" claim un-
der the First Amendment focuses on the matter of user and observer
understandings and expectations: would a reasonable observer under-
stand the complaining party to be engaging in speech or expressive
conduct? Part III accordingly takes up the question of whether Internet
users perceive their broadband providers to be "speaking" with respect to
the third-party content and applications that users create, share, and
download on the Internet. Because users do not recognize their Internet
access providers to be responsible for the speech of the third-party in-
formation services these providers happen to transport, the Supreme
Court's user-expectations doctrine is a major obstacle to providers' free
speech objections to the FCC's proposed nondiscrimination rule.
The compelled speech doctrine also requires an examination of
whether the owner of a platform on which others are speaking has the
opportunity to expressly disavow connection with the speech and ideas
of these third-party content providers. Part IV enumerates the
3. PruneYard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74 (1980).
4. Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic & Inst'l Rights, Inc., 547 U.S. 47 (2006).
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mechanisms used by Internet access providers for this purpose, and
distinguishes contexts in which Internet providers engage in speech or
content partnerships from the separate role of such providers as a
transportation conduit through which users gain access to the larger
world of third-party content and applications on the open Internet.
Perhaps these objections to the relevance of First Amendment scru-
tiny are premised on an antiquated doctrinal preservation of
governmental regulation in the areas of pervasive media or scarce spec-
trum? Or perhaps the Internet is so essential to the promotion of free
speech that all elements of its infrastructure should be walled off from
regulation and governmental interference? Part V responds to the claim
that broadband providers should be entitled to a heightened degree of
First Amendment protection based on the fact that their transmission of
content and applications takes place on the medium of the Internet, as
opposed to some other communicative medium where a lower degree of
scrutiny might be appropriate. While the concerns underlying such a
principle may apply to Internet content and applications (as per Reno v.
ACLU),' these concerns are found to be orthogonal-and in some situa-
tions diametrically opposed-to the interest in ensuring the openness
and predictability of Internet access and connectivity.
The FCC's proposed nondiscrimination rule is an attempt to ensure
that when access providers route "lawful content, applications, and ser-
vices" to users on behalf of some third-party information providers, they
are also obligated to route lawful content, applications, and services to
users from all other information providers. Based on this understanding
of the FCC's nondiscrimination rule as a form of the equal access rule
upheld in Rumsfeld, the Article concludes that the nondiscrimination rule
does not affect the speech and association rights of access providers.
Internet access providers do not accrue the speech rights associated with
the third-party content, applications, and other communications that they
transport to users through their networks.
I. HISTORICAL CONTEXT FOR OPEN INTERNET RULES
The Internet today plays an undeniably central role in mass commu-
nications, but this role depends upon a distinction between those
5. Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 870 (1997) (focusing on Internet content, applica-
tions, and services such as audio, video, images, chat rooms, web pages, listservs, and
newsgroups-rather than lower-layer infrastructure and broadband access services-prior to
articulating standard of strict First Amendment scrutiny of regulations targeting Internet con-
tent).
6. Open Internet NPRM, supra note 1, at 13068.
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elements of the network that consist of content, applications, and ser-
vices, and those underlying elements of the network that serve to
transport bits of content, applications, and services from one node or
user to another.
Historically, policymakers and regulators have implemented this dis-
tinction by treating transmission networks differently from the content
and applications that flow through networks. For instance, prior to the
Telecommunications Act of 1996,' the FCC differentiated its treatment
of networks from its treatment of content by employing a distinction be-
tween "basic" and "enhanced" services. In the Second Computer
Inquiry, basic services were associated with the provision of "pure
transmission capability over a communications path that is virtually
transparent in terms of its interaction with customer supplied informa-
tion."' By contrast, enhanced services were those that employed
"computer processing applications .. . to act on the content, code, proto-
col, and other aspects of the subscriber's information," provided
"additional, different, or restructured information," or simply involved
"subscriber interaction with stored information."9
This distinction between networks and the content/applications/
information being carried over networks, or between basic and enhanced
services, persisted through the next iterations of the FCC's inquiries. In
1986, the FCC found that "[d]ata processing, computer memory or stor-
age, and switching techniques can be components of a basic service if
they are used solely to facilitate the movement of information."'o The dis-
tinction between basic and enhanced services was also retained by
Congress in the Telecommunications Act of 1996." The Act set forth a
distinction between "telecommunications" and "information services."
Congress defined "telecommunications" as "the transmission . . . of
7. Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 (1996).
8. Second Computer Inquiry, 77 F.C.C.2d 384, 420 para. 96, modified on recon., 84
F.C.C.2d 50, modified on further recon., 84 F.C.C.2d 512 (1980), affd sub nom. Computer &
Commc'ns Indus. Ass'n v. FCC, 693 F.2d 198 (D.C. Cir. 1982), affd on second further re-
con., 56 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 301, 1984 FCC Lexis 2809 (May 4, 1984).
9. Id. at 420-21 para. 97; accord 47 C.F.R. § 64.702(a) (2010).
10. Third Computer Inquiry, 104 F.C.C.2d 958, 967-68 para. 10 (1986) (emphasis
added), recon., 2 FCC Red. 3035 (1987), further recon., 3 FCC Rcd. 1135 (1988), second
further recon., 4 FCC Rcd. 5927 (1989), vacated sub nom. California v. FCC, 905 F.2d 1217
(9th Cir. 1990); see also Indep. Data Commc'ns Mfrs. Ass'n, 10 FCC Rcd. 13717 (1995)
(characterizing AT&T's frame relay service as a basic rather than enhanced service because
"[r]egardless of changes made to the frame header, the customer's data contained within the
frame are not modified in any way as they travel through the network and arrive intact").
I1. See Fed.-State Joint Bd. on Universal Serv., 22 FCC Red. 11811, 11814 para. 9 &
n.27 (2007) (citing Non-Accounting Safeguards Order, 11 FCC Rcd. 21905, 21958 para. 107
(1997)) ("The Commission has previously found that Congress preserved the Commission's
pre-1996 Act treatment of 'adjunct-to-basic' services as telecommunications services, rather
than information services.").
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information of the user's choosing, without change in the form or con-
tent of the information as sent and received." 2 By contrast, an
"information service" was defined as "the offering of a capability for
generating, acquiring, storing, transforming, processing, retrieving, util-
izing, or making available information via telecommunications . . . .""
It is in the context of this long-running distinction that the FCC re-
cently issued a set of proposed "net neutrality" or "open Internet" rules
governing the providers of telecommunications facilities, but forbearing
from regulation of providers of content, applications, and services.14
At first glance, the FCC's proposed rules do not sound particularly
notable, given that they embody a series of principles that telecommuni-
cations providers avow they are already following and will continue to
follow regardless of whether and how the principles are formalized.
Invoking the language of consumer rights and expectations, the FCC
seeks to codify the following six user-focused principles:
* access to lawful Internet content of one's choice;
* ability to run applications and services of one's choice;
* ability to connect one's choice of legal devices that do not
harm the network;
* competition among network providers, application and ser-
vice providers, and content providers;
* a ban on broadband providers' ability to discriminate based
on the lawful content, applications, or services accessed by
their users; and
* disclosure of network management practices by broadband
providers.
12. 47 U.S.C. § 153(43) (2006).
13. Id. § 153(20). Congress specifically stated that an information service "does not
include any use of any such capability for the management, control, or operation of a tele-
communications system or the management of a telecommunications service." Id. (emphasis
added). For a more detailed discussion of this "telecommunications management exception"
to the definition of information services, see Reply Comments of Nicholas Bramble, Broad-
band Framework NOI, supra note 1, GN Docket No. 10-127, at 14-17 (Aug. 12, 2010),
available at http://fjallfoss.fcc.gov/ecfs/document/view?id=7020706676 (discussing and ap-
plying criteria of the adjunct-to-basic designation in the context of Internet connectivity).
14. See Open Internet NPRM, supra note 1, at 13065 para. 4.
15. See, e.g., Comments of Verizon and Verizon Wireless, Open Internet NPRM, supra
note 1, GN Docket No. 09-191, at 1 (Jan. 14, 2010) [hereinafter Verizon NPRM Comments],
available at http://fjallfoss.fcc.gov/ecfs/document/view?id=7020378523 ("Everyone agrees
the Internet should be open, driven by informed consumer choice, and exist in an environment
that allows innovation and investment to continue to flourish.").
16. See Open Internet NPRM, supra note 1, at 13101-08 paras. 92, 104, 119.
III Telecommunications
Of these principles, the most divisive has been the fifth: a ban on
broadband providers' ability to discriminate based on the content, appli-
cations, and services that are being accessed by the providers' users.1
This nondiscrimination rule sits at the heart of the FCC's recent "open
Internet" rulemaking,'" and has generated a fair amount of controversy
among the Internet connectivity providers who might be subject to it. For
instance, in response to the proposed nondiscrimination rule, AT&T ar-
gued that the FCC would effectively be infringing upon the speech rights
of broadband providers in four separate ways. First, AT&T argues that
the rule would wrongfully compel providers "to carry the messages of all
content and application providers."'9 Second, as AT&T would have it, the
nondiscrimination rule bars broadband providers from exercising the
"editorial discretion" guaranteed by cases such as Turner and Time
Warner.2 Third, AT&T contends that the rule would preclude providers
"from entering into arrangements that would allow them to provide high-
quality content" to users.2 Finally, AT&T argues that the rule would un-
constitutionally increase the expense of broadband providers' speech "by
necessitating capacity upgrades."22
Other telecommunications carriers and advocates have raised a simi-
larly broad set of First Amendment objections to the FCC's rules,
arguing that the proposal "would impermissibly burden speech" of both
Internet providers and their partners.24 In response to a later FCC notice
relating to reclassification of broadband Internet service under Title II of
the Communications Act,25 Verizon conceptualizes the matter more suc-
cinctly:
Verizon's broadband platform is a medium through which it of-
fers a form of speech-its own Internet and other content
17. The FCC proposes to formalize this fifth principle as follows: "Subject to reason-
able network management, a provider of broadband Internet access service must treat lawful
content, applications, and services in a nondiscriminatory manner." Id. at 13104 para. 104.
18. See id. at 13104-08 paras. 103-17.
19. Comments of AT&T Inc., Open Internet NPRM, supra note 1, GN Docket No. 09-
191, at 236 (Jan. 14, 2010) [hereinafter AT&T NPRM Comments] (emphasis omitted), avail-
able at http://fjallfoss.fcc.gov/ecfs/document/view?id=7020377217.
20. Id. at 236 & n.518 (citing Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 636
(1994); Time Warner Entm't Co. v. FCC, 240 F.3d 1126, 1129-30 (D.C. Cir. 2001)).
21. Id. at 236.
22. Id. at 236-37.
23. See, e.g., Comments of Time Warner Cable, Inc., Ex. A, Open Internet NPRM,
supra note 1, GN Docket No. 09-191 (Jan. 14, 2010) [hereinafter Tribe & Goldstein NPRM
Comments], available at http://fjallfoss.fcc.gov/ecfs/document/view?id=7020375998.
24. Comments of Verizon and Verizon Wireless, Broadband Framework N1OT, supra
note 1, GN Docket No. 10-127, at 9 (July 15, 2010) [hereinafter Verizon NOI Comments],
available at http://fjallfoss.fcc.gov/ecfs/document/view?id=7020544554.
25. See Broadband Framework NOI, supra note 1.
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services-to its customers. That platform serves as the micro-
phone through which broadband Internet access providers speak,
and governmental restrictions that inhibit the reach or use of that
microphone necessarily impinge on First Amendment interests.26
Verizon argues that broadband Internet access providers occupy a
position under the First Amendment that "is no different than a newspa-
per publisher's." 27 Verizon analogizes the function of broadband
networks to the printing press on two grounds: first, "[b]oth are the
means by which speech is facilitated and disseminated," and second, "in
both contexts the speaker makes numerous choices about the content and
format of the speech that will be disseminated." 28 All in all, Verizon sug-
gests that "[t]he role of the Internet as a mode of mass communications"
is closely on par with "the role of privately-owned newspapers in earlier
days."2 9
However, notwithstanding these analogies to cable and newsgather-
ing enterprises, telecommunications providers spend little time on the
question of how precisely they are to be considered as "speakers" under
the First Amendment. AT&T, for instance, simply avows that broadband
providers are speakers because providers (1) "may include original con-
tent in their offerings;" (2) "may engage in the editorial organization of
content;" and (3) "may provide tailored offerings aimed at certain sub-
scriber groups."30
The following sections thus attempt to elucidate and apply criteria to
determine the answer to the question largely elided by respondents in
this debate: whether or not providers of Internet connectivity engage in
sufficient speech or expressive conduct to trigger First Amendment scru-
tiny of a regulation governing their actions.
11. TECHNOLOGICAL ARCHITECTURE OF THE INTERNET
AS A BASIS FOR FIRST AMENDMENT EVALUATION
The First Amendment argument most salient to the FCC's proposed
nondiscrimination rule is found within AT&T's claim, listed above, that
broadband providers engage in speech through their "editorial organiza-
26. Verizon NOI Comments, supra note 24, at 79. Verizon was the sole telecommuni-
cations provider to mount a First Amendment objection in its comment to this reclassification
proceeding.
27. Id. at 80.
28. Id. at 79.
29. Id. at 79-80.
30. AT&T NPRM Comments, supra note 19, at 235-36.
tion" of the content requested by and delivered to subscribers." The
separate argument that an Internet access provider receives speech pro-
tection in its provision of original content should be set to one side for
purposes of this discussion. Internet access providers may well deserve
to be treated as speakers for the content they originate; the key question
here is how they should be treated with respect to the third-party content
they merely convey.
This same "editorialization" theme is sounded in Laurence Tribe and
Thomas Goldstein's response to the FCC's proposed nondiscrimination
rules, in which they compare Internet access providers to newspapers
and other content providers. Tribe and Goldstein argue that
"[i]ndividuals and media outlets make countless decisions each day
about what they will or will not say, and their decision not to communi-
cate a particular message is entitled to the same First Amendment
protection as their decision to communicate it."' 2 Separately, Professor
Tribe has argued that
[t]he Supreme Court has unanimously recognized that when you
are a provider of communication, the right to decide what you
will include in the package and what you will exclude-whether
you will tell the consumer, "if you're going to get this channel,
you also have to get the Discovery Channel" or "if you're going
to get this, you also have to get C-SPAN, like it or not"-is at
the heart of First Amendment freedom.
The basic point made by Tribe and others is that the practice of mak-
ing choices as to what content passes through one's pipes (or over one's
airwaves, or in one's communications package) implies a right to be pro-
tected from governmental interference with how one makes these
choices.
This set of arguments, while persuasive as to the free speech inter-
ests of journalists, and potentially relevant to the interests of cable
television operators,34 requires more detailed consideration before it can
be applied to Internet access providers.
Autonomy for speakers, including autonomy for broadband provid-
ers when they are speaking as originators of Internet content, is a
31. Id. at 235.
32. Tribe & Goldstein NPRM Comments, supra note 23, at 2.
33. Laurence H. Tribe, Address at the Progress & Freedom Foundation's 2007 Aspen
Summit: Freedom of Speech and Press in the 21st Century: New Technology Meets Old Con-
stitutionalism, 13- 14 (Aug. 21, 2007), available at http://www.pff.org/issues-pubs/pops/
popl 4.19tribetranscript.pdf.
34. See infra Part II.B (discussing analogies and distinctions between cable television
providers and Internet access providers).
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fundamental First Amendment value, as the Supreme Court has affirmed
in a number of cases." But the conduct and the "decisions" that would be
regulated under a nondiscrimination requirement-including the trans-
mission of data packets containing information generated by third
parties-differ in important ways from the conduct and decisions en-
gaged in by organizers of a parade, a cable broadcasting system, and a
newspaper. In brief, there are two chief differences between Internet ac-
cess and these other forums for expression that have been proffered as
analogues to the transport layer of the Internet.
First, in providing Internet access to subscribers, providers route bits
of information from users to third parties, and from third parties back to
users. The First Amendment no more shields their activities than it
would shield the Postal Service, or a courier firm, that wished to selec-
tively and secretly delay some of the letters it carried. Second, Tribe and
Goldstein are incorrect to suggest that the FCC's nondiscrimination rule
"seek[s] to override the decisions of [Broadband Service Providers]
about what content they will deliver to their subscribers." 6 It is users, not
Internet access providers, who make these decisions about what kinds of
content to send and receive.
A. Routing or Transporting Information from One Party to
Another Does Not Implicate an Internet Connectivity
Provider in the Speech or Expression of Those Parties
The mere fact that Internet access providers carry the communica-
tions of others is, on its own, insufficient to bring a regulation of the
actions of providers within the scope of First Amendment scrutiny. "'[I]t
has never been deemed an abridgement of freedom of speech or press to
make a course of conduct illegal merely because the conduct was in part
initiated, evidenced, or carried out by means of language, either spoken,
35. See, e.g., Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 221 (2003) ("The First Amendment
securely protects the freedom to make-or decline to make-one's own speech."); see also
Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic & Inst'l Rights, Inc., 547 U.S. 47, 61 (2006) ("Some of this
Court's leading First Amendment precedents have established the principle that freedom of
speech prohibits the government from telling people what they must say."); Hurley v. Irish-
Am. Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Grp. of Bos., 515 U.S. 557, 576 (1995) ("[W]hen dissemination
of a view contrary to one's own is forced upon a speaker intimately connected with the com-
munication advanced, the speaker's right to autonomy over the message is compromised.");
Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Pub. Utils. Comm'n, 475 U.S. 1, 20 (1986) (finding that a utility
commission order "impermissibly burdens appellant's First Amendment rights because it
forces appellant to associate with the views of other speakers"); W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v.
Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943) ("[N]o official, high or petty, can prescribe what shall be
orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion or force citizens to
confess by word or act their faith therein.").
36. Tribe & Goldstein NPRM Comments, supra note 23, at 3.
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written, or printed.'"" Similarly, although the Supreme Court has
worked from a broad understanding of the number and types of "mes-
sages" that count as speech," the Court has consistently rejected the
notion that "conduct can be labeled 'speech' whenever the person engag-
ing in the conduct intends thereby to express an idea."" Conduct must be
"inherently expressive" in order to merit First Amendment protection. 4 0
What is needed beyond the presence of language and the intention to
express an idea, then, is the additional predicate of involvement with
speech (or expressive selection of speech) by the party claiming a speech
right.
In some other communications contexts, such as broadcast-based
media, the owner and operator of a centralized infrastructure must decide
which content and what programs to include in the channels it makes
available to subscribers. In those settings, the selective activities of
broadcasters may more closely resemble speech and expressive con-
duct.4 ' The expressive, propositional, or informational value associated
with Internet connectivity, however, is located not within the technical
protocol or the underlying infrastructure itself, but rather in the data that
flows through that infrastructure. This different technological infrastruc-
ture yields a different First Amendment analysis.
1. A Brief Primer on the Network Infrastructure of
Internet-Based Communications
The infrastructure underlying a communications technology like
Internet connectivity serves primarily to route and transmit datagrams,
37. Rumsfeld, 547 U.S. at 62 (quoting Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co., 336 U.S.
490, 502 (1949)). For instance, "the lewd and obscene, the profane, the libelous, and the in-
sulting or 'fighting' words" do not receive First Amendment protection. Chaplinsky v. New
Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571-72 (1942). Many additional categories of conduct are not in-
herently expressive and thus do not receive First Amendment protection, despite containing
communicative elements. See, e.g., Nat'l Soc'y of Prof'l Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S.
679, 697-98 (1978) (finding government restrictions on agreements in restraint of trade out-
side of First Amendment scrutiny); Giboney, 336 U.S. at 498 (finding communications in
furtherance of crimes not protected by First Amendment).
38. See, e.g., Hurley, 515 U.S. at 569 (including the artistic works of Pollock, Schan-
berg, and Carroll within the limits of First Amendment protection despite their randomized,
atonal, or nonsensical character).
39. Rumsfeld, 547 U.S. at 65-66 (quoting United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376
(1968)).
40. Id. at 65-66; see also id. at 64 (finding that a school's decision to permit recruiters
to enter campus was not inherently expressive). Conduct is not "inherently expressive" where
it must be accompanied with additional speech in order to explain its meaning. See id. at 65-
66.
41. See Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 636 (1994) (finding the cable
programmers are engaged in speech when they make editorial decisions about content or pro-
gramming).
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the basic transfer units between networks, generated by external parties.4 2
Under the Internet Protocol Suite, a given communication packet di-
rected across the Internet from one endpoint to another will typically
arrive at the routers of an Internet connectivity provider in the same form
as it leaves those routers.43 In the course of this transmission, the data or
communications within the packet remains largely invisible to the Inter-
net infrastructure provider, because it has been encapsulated within a
series of headers that serve as addresses and frames enabling the data to
enter and travel upon the physical network from the sending computer to
the requesting computer." These headers do facilitate a communicative
purpose in the sense that they link one computer to another and ensure
the stability and reliability of that link. Yet while this transmission link
enables two external parties to accomplish a communicative goal, it con-
tains no expression of its own. Indeed, by the time a communications
packet reaches the requesting computer, the header and frame informa-
tion that had been used to encapsulate the data in the course of its transit
are removed, and the requesting computer is able to read this data in its
pure form.4 5 A physical, network-based, or TCP/IP-based link that did
interject content of its own into the data being requested would interfere
with the communications taking place between the external parties.46
Internet access and transport involves routing whatever data the par-
ties request from one place to another,47 not upon the centrally managed
42. The Internet Protocol Suite consists of both a control component for directly ex-
changing data between hosts on a network (Transmission Control Protocol, or TCP) and a
more systemic method for addressing and routing data across multiple networks (Internet
Protocol, or IP). See Vinton G. Cerf & Robert E. Kahn, A Protocol for Packet Network Inter-
communication, 22 IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON COMM. 605, 637 (1974) (developing the TCP/IP
model for sharing data on a packet-switched network of networks); see also NETWORK WORK-
ING GRP., REQUEST FOR COMMENTS 1812, REQUIREMENTS FOR IP VERSION 4 ROUTERS 28-31
(Fred Baker ed., June 1995) available at http://tools.ietf.org/pdf/rfc 1812 (describing functions
to be performed by Internet routers).
43. See BARBARA VAN SCHEWICK, INTERNET ARCHITECTURE AND INNOVATION 55
(2010) (noting that the layering principle of network design, which mandates that a destination
layer "receive exactly the same object sent by layer n at the source," will be violated where a
lower-layer protocol "permanently modiflies] the object passed to it by a higher-layer protocol
for delivery to its higher-layer protocol peer").
44. See How Encapsulation Works Within the TCP/IP Model, LEARNING NETWORK
(Jan. 27, 2008), http://leam-networking.com/tcp-ip/how-encapsulation-works-within-the-
tcpip-model.
45. See id.
46. See BARBARA VAN SCHEWICK, INTERNET ARCHITECTURE AND INNOVATION 67
(2010) ("Lower layers of the system (the network) should provide only general services and
functions of broad utility across applications in order to support as many higher-layer applica-
tions as possible.") (addressing broad version of end-to-end network design principle).
47. See Philip J. Weiser, Toward a Next Generation Regulatory Strategy, 35 Lov. U.
CHI. L.J. 41 (2003) (describing the "advent of digital, packet-switched broadband networks
that carry all forms of communication").
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delivery of carefully programmed channels. The administrators and ac-
cess providers who implement Internet communications-but do not
create or substantially alter the underlying bits of individual communica-
tions-do not express themselves through their activities. Rather, they
facilitate the expression of others. An Internet access provider delivering
Web content to a user has, at heart, nothing more to do than an act of
translating a user's request into the bits that objectively correspond to
that request, and then delivering those bits back to the user's browser. No
creativity and no substantive editing takes place during this process.
In managing the network through which this content flows, an ac-
cess provider may attempt to block spam, viruses, and other malicious
software, and may act to resolve network congestion.48 However, these
network management practices all seek to ensure the rapid and objec-
tive satisfaction of a user's request, not to provide any content or
speech above and beyond what the user has requested. 49 Thus, the role
of the Internet access provider is conveyance rather than expression,
and the process of offering Internet access and transmission does not
satisfy the First Amendment predicate of speech or expressive selection
of others' speech.
2. Analogies to Other Media
In a variety of cases beyond the world of the Internet where a me-
dium, forum, or technology fulfills a fundamentally facilitative role, the
administrator of that medium will generally not be found to be engaging
in expressive conduct or speech.o
For instance, the expressive content in a letter or package does not
convert the transportation and delivery activities of FedEx, UPS, or DHL
into speech or expressive conduct. Like these delivery services, Internet
connectivity providers manage their networks to ensure fast and efficient
communication from sender to recipient, and provide tools for reading
48. For instance, an Internet connectivity provider may seek to stop the spread of spam,
fight against malware and virus-based attacks on network infrastructure, mitigate against the
possibility of traffic congestion by efficiently routing and limiting access at certain times and
places where appropriate, and build out network capacity. In addition, such a provider may
also engage in more loosely defined forms of network management: assisting the activities of
law enforcement, distributing optional filters for the protection of children from offensive
content, etc.
49. Implicit in a user request for content, one might say, is a corollary request-and a
settled expectation-that no spam or viruses be attached to the delivery of the requested con-
tent.
50. See, e.g.. Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic & Inst'l Rights, Inc., 547 U.S. 47, 64
(2006) (-[A] law school's decision to allow recruiters on campus is not inherently expressive.
Law schools facilitate recruiting to assist their students in obtaining jobs.").
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the addresses of communications and routing those communications to
their intended destination.
While transportation and mailing services may provide the simplest
analogue to Internet access, a variety of additional media-such as air-
plane navigation charts and aeronautical charts-transmit expressive
content to users and do not thereby trigger First Amendment scrutiny.'
Geographic, navigational, and instrument approach charts, for instance,
are important not for performance of some original expressive function,
but rather their ability to inform users-and the corresponding ability of
users to rely upon these media for their needs.52 Courts have been ex-
plicit in articulating the importance of this reliance interest,53 and have
used that reliance interest, rather than any ostensible speech interest, as a
basis for legal evaluation.54
An aeronautical chart translates or transmits data provided by other
content providers into a form that is accessible to the users and subscrib-
ers of the chart. In this manner, it is enabling navigation in roughly the
same way that Internet access providers enable online communication.
As with a hypothetical rule that might seek to preserve users' ability to
rely upon navigational charts, the FCC's proposed nondiscrimination
rules are an attempt to ensure that the communication facilities on which
Internet users depend will continue to "translate [user-requested] infor-
mation into an instantly understandable .. . representation."" The
effective and efficient exchange of Internet communications from one
speaker to another cannot take place if an intermediary interferes with
the integrity, reliability, and certainty of this transmission process. Ac-
cordingly, the FCC's rule would ensure that those who create Internet
applications and content can rely on the networks and transportation
platforms on which their information is shared not to diverge from layer-
51. See, e.g., Brocklesby v. United States, 767 F.2d 1288 (9th Cir. 1985); Saloomey v.
Jeppesen & Co., 707 F.2d 671 (2d Cir. 1983); Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Jeppesen & Co., 642
F.2d 339 (9th Cir. 1981).
52. See Aetna, 642 F.2d at 342 ("While the information conveyed in words and figures
on the Las Vegas approach chart was completely correct, the purpose of the chart was to
translate this information into an instantly understandable graphic representation. This was
what gave the chart its usefulness; this is what the chart contributed to the mere data amassed
and promulgated by the FAA.").
53. See, e.g., id. ("It was reliance on this graphic portrayal that Jeppesen invited.").
54. See, e.g., id.; see also Robert Post, Recuperating First Amendment Doctrine, 47
STAN. L. REv. 1249, 1254 (1995) ("Navigation charts for airplanes, for instance, are clearly
media in which speakers successfully communicate particularized messages. And yet when
inaccurate charts cause accidents, courts do not conceptualize suits against the charts' authors
as raising First Amendment questions.")
55. See id.
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ing and modularity design principles based on circumstances and factors
known only to the access provider or network manager.
B. Because Internet Access Providers Are Not Speaking or
Engaging in Organization of Speech When They
Transport the Lawful Content and Applications of
Others, Regulation of This Activity Cannot
Represent Compelled Speech
The inaptness of the analogy between Internet connectivity providers
and speakers is further demonstrated by the far closer analogy between
the conduct of Internet providers and the conduct of the law school
plaintiffs in Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic & Institutional Rights,
Inc." Where a medium, forum, or technology performs a conveyance or
facilitative role, a rule requiring the administrator of that medium to ac-
commodate an external message does not amount to compelled speech
where "the accommodation does not sufficiently interfere with any mes-
sage of the [medium or forum]."" Broadband providers make it possible
for third-party speakers and application makers to connect with end us-
ers, just as law schools make it possible for military recruiters (and other
third-party speakers) to connect with law students. Neither broadband
providers nor law schools accrue speech rights through these facilitative
processes.
Resisting the above description of the non-expressive nature of rout-
ing and transporting Internet traffic, Verizon argues that the FCC's
proposed nondiscrimination rule triggers and fails First Amendment
scrutiny because it "interferes with a speaker's judgment on what speech
56. Numerous businesses supplying applications and content to users rely on predict-
able non-interference from the network infrastructure on which their information exchange
platforms are built. If disclosure and nondiscrimination rules were not in place, the resulting
situation would be analogous to one in which the owners of the power grid could ban users
from plugging in a computer or a toaster, or grant more power to certain applications than to
others on the same connection, or change voltages without notice to users. The disclosure and
nondiscrimination rules proposed by the FCC are thus first and foremost about promoting
users' reliance upon an open, neutral, and reliable network. The rules are targeted not towards
the message, speech, or expressive conduct of Internet access providers; instead, they are
targeted towards the functional effects of access providers' conduct within the ecosystem of
the Internet. See Open Internet NPRM, supra note 1, 13088-90 paras. 62-64 (recognizing the
"historically open architecture of the Internet" and the extent to which this architecture "has
facilitated entrepreneurs' entry into the market with new Internet services and promoted the
[Communications] Act's policies favoring 'a diversity of media voices' and 'technological
advancement' ").
57. See generally Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic & Inst'l Rights, Inc., 547 U.S. 47
(2006) (discussed infra Part Ill).
58. Id. at 64.
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to feature or promote." 9 Similarly, some Internet access providers have
argued that a nondiscrimination rule may "preclud[e] market actors from
enhancing particular messages to communicate more effectively with the
public," and that such a preclusion amounts to a First Amendment viola-
tion.6 Laurence Tribe and Thomas Goldstein summarize these concerns
in their argument that net neutrality proposals "generally would require a
[Broadband Service Provider] to treat all the data on its own network
equally, forbidding it to make the choices that will benefit its users in the
aggregate and that will respond to customers' desire to limit (or to accel-
erate delivery of) the Internet content they want to receive."
To make these and similar points, Verizon relies not on Rumsfeld, but
on Hurley.62 In Hurley, the Supreme Court held under the First Amend-
ment that organizers of a parade could not be compelled by the state to
include a group of marchers whose message the parade organizers found
objectionable.6 ' The parade organizers were thus free to exclude a group
of gay, lesbian, and bisexual marchers whose message was "that people
of their sexual orientations have as much claim to unqualified social ac-
ceptance as heterosexuals."6 The imprecision of the message carried by
the parade was tempered by the recognition on the part of its organizers
(along with audience members and would-be participants) that a clear
message would be sent by the inclusion or exclusion of a group that had
been "formed for the very purpose of marching in" the parade.6 ' Both
organizer and participant were well aware of the "message" the other
side wished to communicate, the importance and salience of this mes-
59. Verizon NPRM Comments, supra note 15, at 116 (citing Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay,
Lesbian & Bisexual Grp. of Bos., 515 U.S. 557, 568-70 (1995)).
60. See, e.g., AT&T NPRM Comments, supra note 19, at 16-17, 235-44; Verizon NOI
Comments, supra note 24, at 79 (arguing that restrictions on the reach or use of "the micro-
phone through which broadband Internet access providers speak ... necessarily impinge on
First Amendment interests").
61. Tribe & Goldstein NPRM Comments, supra note 23, at 3.
62. See Verizon NPRM Comments, supra note 15, at 116. A search of filings in rele-
vant FCC proceedings-including Open Internet NPRM, supra note 1, and Broadband
Framework NOI, supra note 1-reveals no citations to Rumsfeld by any telecommunications
company.
63. Hurley, 515 U.S. at 570.
64. Id. at 574. Recognizing the "message" of a parade as more diffuse and decentral-
ized than the message of a newspaper, the court still decided to extend First Amendment
protection on the principle that a speaker should not be found to forfeit protection merely by
"failing to edit their themes to isolate an exact message as the exclusive subject matter of the
speech." Id. at 569-70. The court found that the group in question wished to use its participa-
tion in the parade "to celebrate its members' identity as openly gay, lesbian, and bisexual
descendants of the Irish immigrants, to show that there are such individuals in the community,
and to support the like men and women who sought to march in the New York parade." Id. at
570. Clearly, the organization of the parade implicated a decision to express, or repress, a
viewpoint and an identity.
65. Id. at 570.
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sage, and the corresponding importance of their prospective participation
in the parade.' Because the presence of a gay pride banner would likely
convey to the public that the parade organizers approved of the group's
message, the Court held that parade organizers could not be compelled
to carry this message.
Hurley, in short, stands for the principle that where groups of people
seek to make a "collective point" through their participation in a shared
activity,6" and the messages espoused by participating groups will be rea-
sonably imputed to the managers of the activity, the managerial choices
as to which viewpoints to disseminate-and which to exclude-will be
protected under the First Amendment.69 But numerous factors distinguish
the provision of Internet connectivity from the organization of a parade.
Compared with a parade, the size of the relevant pool of potential
"participants" on the Internet is so much more immense that it simply
cannot be said that access providers make individualized editorial deci-
sions as to what content to include or exclude.o In the context of cable
(or other "managed" media, such as a newspaper), it is clear that broad-
casters necessarily exercise some measure of discretion in determining
what package of programming content to deliver to customers, and that
customers differentiate between cable companies based on which basic
and premium programming options are offered. But in the context of
Internet access, there are so many "participating units" that the decision
to include or exclude one or another of these units (assuming such an
inclusion or exclusion were even feasible) cannot possibly be said to
66. See id. at 568-69 (listing various forms of symbolic expression in a parade includ-
ing spectators, costumes, uniforms, flags, banners, bands, and floats conveying political and
moral messages to spectators and a television audience, and characterizing parades as "public
dramas of social relations" where "performers define who can be a social actor and what sub-
jects and ideas are available for communication and consideration" (quoting SUSAN G. DAVIS,
PARADES AND POWER: STREET THEATRE IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY PHILADELPHIA 6
(1986))).
67. See id. at 575.
68. See id. at 558.
69. See id. at 576 (declining to "force[] upon a speaker intimately connected with the
communication advanced" the "dissemination of a view contrary to [the speaker's] own").
70. If the Internet were to be analogized to a parade, it would have to be considered the
largest parade in the world-a parade to which everyone is invited to participate and everyone
is invited to watch, with no restrictions on access. The analogy to a parade fails on the addi-
tional grounds that the Internet, unlike a parade, is not tethered to any time or physical
location. See Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 851 (1997) ("Taken together, these tools [e-mail,
listservs. newsgroups, chat rooms, and the World Wide Web] constitute a unique medium-
known to its users as 'cyberspace'-located in no particular geographical location but avail-
able to anyone, anywhere in the world, with access to the Internet.").
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have a substantial or, typically, even a de minimis effect upon the "mes-
sage" supposedly being conveyed by an access provider."
The Internet also lacks the compositional character of a parade or
cable system . In contrast to the conduct of the parade organizers as
composers in Hurley, there is no sense in which Internet access providers
can exercise an even roughly similar degree of editorial discretion over
the wealth of content on the Internet." The complete absence of scarcity
at the content and application layers of the Internet, the tremendous vari-
ety of modes and forums for expression, the ever-changing structure of
this expression, and the constant creation of new expression all militate
against the possibility of an Internet access provider's ongoing editorial
selection and supervision of the content traveling through its networks.74
Few designations could be more inaccurate in describing the activities of
an Internet access provider than that of a composer. And any attempt by
providers to offer specific managed channels for the rapid delivery of
71. Some Internet access providers have proposed offering original or partner content
on a channel separate from its provision of basic Internet connectivity. See, e.g., Press Release,
Google, Verizon-Google Legislative Framework Proposal (Aug. 9, 2010), available at
http://www.google.com/googleblogs/pdfs/verizon-google-legislative framework-proposal0
81010.pdf. But these managed services can likely be differentiated, on both technological and
First Amendment grounds, from the providers' basic offer of Internet connectivity. See infra
Part IV.B.1 (developing a list of factors for differentiating managed services from Internet
access). Where a provider exercises a greater degree of editorial discretion in determining
what content to provide within its managed channels, it ceases to provide Internet access and
connectivity, and would begin to trigger a level of First Amendment scrutiny more analogous
to that applied in Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622 (1994), and other cases deal-
ing with regulation of the organization of cable and newspaper content.
72. Cf. Hurley, 515 U.S. at 574 ("Rather like a composer, the Council selects the ex-
pressive units of the parade from potential participants... . [E]ach contingent's expression in
the Council's eyes comports with what merits celebration on that day.").
73. Those who organize a parade surely do not supply all of the wide range of mes-
sages and expressions contained within that parade, just as those who organize a cable system
do not themselves generate all-or in some cases any-of the programming they transmit.
What the organizers of a newspaper, cable system, and to a lesser extent a parade do, for the
most part, is engage in a two-part process. First, they examine a range of possible candidates
for inclusion within their particular medium of expression; then, they make a series of edito-
rial selections as to which programming content-or in the case of a parade, which marching
contingents-to include within their medium of expression. At the same time, they make a
corresponding set of decisions as to which candidates to exclude. The same process holds true
for newspaper editors: most opinion pages can be described as "the presentation of an edited
compilation of speech generated by other persons," the presentation of which requires an
explicit rejection of some proffered submissions as well as an implicit rejection of a much
wider range of other unconsidered candidates. Hurley, 515 U.S. at 570 (citing Miami Herald
Publ'g Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 258 (1974)). Organizers of these various media may be
more or less "lenient in admitting participants," id. at 569, but all, unlike Internet access pro-
viders, are essentially engaged in a process of editorial selection and coordination regarding
which messages to transmit and which to suppress.
74. See Reno, 521 U.S. at 870 (describing the Internet as a "dynamic, multifaceted
category of communication [that] includes not only traditional print and news services, but
also audio, video, and still images, as well as interactive, real time dialogue").
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specific premium content would fundamentally restructure the character
of Internet access to an extent that it would no longer be practicable to
describe the resulting channel as part of the Internet."
Thus, AT&T, Comcast, Verizon, Time Warner Cable, and other
Internet connectivity providers are unable-unlike the parade organizers
in Hurley-to articulate an instance in which the FCC's proposed regula-
tions would "interfere with any message" that they as Internet access
76
providers wish to communicate. Internet access functions as a com-
modity input, essential to basic participation in a networked ecosystem
and to a wide variety of economic and informational exchange systems
engaged in by users and third-party content and application providers.n
In practice, a discretionary decision made by organizers of an Inter-
net access network to deny or enhance the transmission of a particular
content or application provider's services likely has more to do with the
assertion of economic leverage than with any desire to "propound a par-
ticular point of view" to users.76 Similarly, website operators and other
75. See Joint Reply Comments of Various Advocates for the Open Internet, Open Inter-
net NPRM Further Inquiry, GN Docket No. 09-191, at 5 (Nov. 4, 2010) ("If a service provides
prioritized access to a particular application or endpoint/destination, it is not an open Internet
service.").
76. Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic & Inst'l Rights, Inc., 547 U.S. 47, 64 (2006).
77. Twitter, Facebook, Google, Yahoo!, Skype, Netflix, Amazon, and a variety of simi-
larly structured information services (insofar as they attempt to convey speech and data
through access providers' networks to a maximal number of end users) seek to enter the eco-
nomic marketplace of the Internet and to participate in an international network of networks
on which they have built their businesses and methods for communication and distribution.
These companies' participation and desire for interaction with the end users of AT&T, Veri-
zon, Comcast, and other access providers is a matter of functioning effectively as search
engines, social networks, and application providers, and of drawing upon the network effects
that hinge upon reaching as many end users and searchable websites as possible. While these
third parties may gain a speech interest through their provision of original, edited, or carefully
aggregated and arranged information, no such interest accrues to those who provide transpor-
tation pathways for this information. A search engine, for instance, can plausibly be said to
make a context-sensitive evaluation of a user's search query, profile, and prior web-browsing
history in order to determine what content best corresponds to what it believes the user was
looking for (and indeed, can compete with other search engines based on how well it makes
this determination). See Search King Inc. v. Google Tech., Inc., CIV-02-1457-M, 2003 WL
21464568 (W.D. Okla. May 27, 2003) (concluding that Google's PageRank search technology
is protected under the First Amendment because its "representation of relative significance of
a particular web site . . . is fundamentally subjective in nature"). But see Oren Bracha & Frank
Pasquale, Federal Search Commission? Access, Fairness, and Accountability in the Lw of
Search, 93 CORNELL L. REV. 1149, 1197, 1200 (2008) (arguing that the speech of a search
engine provider is a "thin and limited form of speech" based upon "'observations' of rele-
vance manifested as a specific ranking of websites that results from a user's search query" and
that regulations intended to limit "the biases and discriminatory practices of search engines"
will likely be adjudged to be permissible under the First Amendment).
78. Hurley, 515 U.S. at 575. Doubtlessly, some businesses rely on nondiscriminatory
Internet routing, and other businesses-notably Internet access providers-may profit by
moving to discriminatory models, particularly given the oligopolistic character of the market
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information service providers do not understand themselves to be sub-
jecting their speech and data to the editorial discretion of access
providers.7 AT&T's continued transmission of Google's (or any other
information providers') services may be essential to Google's business
model, but it does not bear on the question of whether AT&T is going to
speak as it currently speaks. The speech of AT&T takes place elsewhere:
among other places, on its public policy blog and website.io
The fundamental purpose of providing Internet access is not to con-
vey the viewpoints of a channel manager or access provider (an activity
easily performed on the access provider's own website), but rather to
create an opportunity for an exchange of information between users and
content and application providers (which may include the access pro-
vider acting in its capacity as a content and application provider). The
FCC seeks to provide "a non-discriminatory platform for the robust in-
terchange of ideas."' This purpose of creating an opportunity for the
open exchange of "lawful content, applications, and services"8 2 is analo-
gous to the purpose of the law at issue in Rumsfeld, which enabled
information exchange between military recruiters and students, and en-
sured that these parties could discuss a potential employment
relationship in a space that the school had already opened up to other
parties engaging in similar discussions." In upholding that law, the Court
rejected a number of First Amendment objections based on its technical
understanding of the service and platform provided by law schools."
III. USER PERCEPTIONS AND CONSUMER EXPECTATIONs REGARDING
THE CONDUCT OF INTERNET ACCESS PROVIDERS
In evaluating First Amendment "compelled speech" claims in the
wake of Rumsfeld and PruneYard Shopping Center v. Robins, it is impor-
tant to note that courts analyze not just the technical infrastructure of the
for Internet service. But this economic interdependence has no bearing on the putative speech
interests of service providers.
79. Cf id. at 569 (unlike a parade, there is no expectation among Internet users and
information providers that a centralized Council will make decisions to exclude or admit par-
ticipants).
80. See, e.g., AT&T PUB. POL'Y BLOG, http://www.attpublicpolicy.com (last visited
Oct. 7, 2010); AT&T, http://www.att.com (last visited Oct. 7, 2010); see also infra Part IV.
81. Open Internet NPRM, supra note 1, at 13107 para. 116.
82. Id. at 13067 para. II (emphasis omitted).
83. See Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic & Inst'l Rights, Inc., 547 U.S. 47, 53 (2006)
(citing the government's informal policy under the Solomon Amendment of "requir[ing] uni-
versities to provide military recruiters access to students equal in quality and scope to that
provided to other recruiters" (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
84. Id. at 65; see also infra Part Ill.
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relevant communications platform but also whether reasonable users and
observers would understand the regulated party to be engaging in speech
or expressive conduct. The following section thus seeks to determine
whether Internet users perceive their broadband providers to be engaged
in speech with respect to the content, applications, and services that us-
ers create, share, interact with, and download on the Internet. '
Generally, conduct will be found to be expressive if it communicates
a message-either directly or more diffusely through some broader me-
dium of expression. The Supreme Court has framed this question as a
matter of whether speech or conduct is "sufficiently imbued with ele-
ments of communication to fall within the scope of the First
[Amendment]." 6 In answering this question, the Court asks two basic
questions: first, whether the entity intended to convey a message, and
second, "[whether] the likelihood was great that the message would be
understood by those who viewed it."5 7
Both of these factors-intent to convey a message, and viewer/user
understanding of a message-must be satisfied in order for conduct to
fall within the scope of First Amendment protection. Where there is not
a great likelihood that "the message [of particular conduct] would be
85. The FCC addressed some of these general issues in a 2008 order finding that Com-
cast had violated the FCC's Internet Policy Statement by interfering with subscribers' use of
the BitTorrent protocol and other peer-to-peer networking applications. See Formal Complaint
of Free Press & Pub. Knowledge, 23 FCC Red. 13028, 13054 para. 45 (2008) (barring Com-
cast from interfering with its subscribers' use of peer-to-peer networking applications).
Responding to First Amendment concerns with respect to the Comcast case, the FCC explic-
itly stated that its Order "does not prevent Comcast from communicating with its customers or
others." Id. at 13053 n.203. The FCC denied that it was "dictating the content of any speech,"
and rejected the notion that Comcast itself would even be deemed (by its customers) to be the
speaker of any content delivered through peer-to-peer applications. Id. The FCC instead found
that subscribers would be more likely to attribute peer-to-peer content "to the other parties
with whom they have chosen to interact through those applications." Id. For these reasons, the
FCC rejected a proposed analogy of broadband providers to newspapers, and found that no
First Amendment concerns were raised by its enforcement of a nondiscrimination rule against
Comcast. Id.
86. Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 409 (1974) (per curiam).
87. Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 403-04 (1989) (emphasis added) (internal quota-
tion marks omitted) (quoting Spence, 418 U.S. at 410-11); see also Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay,
Lesbian & Bisexual Grp. of Bos., 515 U.S. 557, 569-70 (1995) (finding that gay, lesbian, and
bisexual individuals intended to convey message through participation in parade and that such
message would be understood by parade viewers). Intent can be based either on a speaker's
particular intent to convey a message or on an administrator's expressive decision to accom-
modate the message of a speaker on its forum. See Hurley, 515 U.S. at 570 (describing
expressive characteristics of both the Council's "selection of contingents to make a parade"
and the marching group's own organizational purposes).
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understood by those who viewed it," the regulated conduct will not con-
stitute protected speech under the First Amendment."'
This second factor of viewer-understanding is generally more diffi-
cult to satisfy. In Rumsfeld, a number of law schools sought to convey
their disapproval of the military's "Don't Ask Don't Tell" policy by
blocking military recruiters from campus." The activity being regulated
thus involved an intention to exclude a viewpoint, in addition to actions
taken to implement that intention. Yet the Supreme Court still found that
"accommodating the military's message does not affect the law schools'
speech, because the schools are not speaking when they host interviews
and recruiting receptions."" The crucial factor in the case was whether
"users" of the law schools perceived the schools to be engaging in
speech through their inclusion or exclusion of military recruiters.'
The Court in Rumsfeld held that the mere fact of hosting (or not
hosting) "interviews and recruiting receptions" on campus was insuffi-
cient to demonstrate that the hosts approved of the speech engaged in by
their guests on campus.92 Rather, whether the owner of a conduit for
speech (for example, a law school) assumes responsibility for messages
and expression flowing through that conduit was found to turn on
whether users of that conduit identified the owner as a speaker or sup-
porter of the messages and expression.93 And where a forum like a school
is "repeatedly . . . used by a wide variety of private organizations," the
Court has held that there is "no realistic danger that the community
would think that the [forum] was endorsing" any one of these particular
organizations or their ideas. 94
Dwelling on the importance of user perceptions, in Rumsfeld the
Court noted that "an observer who sees military recruiters interviewing
away from the law school has no way of knowing whether the law school
is expressing its disapproval of the military, all the law school's inter-
88. See Johnson, 491 U.S. at 404 (quoting Spence, 418 U.S. at 410-1l) (finding that
conduct that is not understood by viewers does not "possess[] sufficient communicative ele-
ments to bring the First Amendment into play").
89. Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic & Inst'l Rights, Inc., 547 U.S. 47, 51.
90. Id. at 64 (emphasis added). The Court added that "a law school's decision to allow
recruiters on campus is not inherently expressive." Id.
91. See id. at 64-65.
92. See id. at 65 ("Nothing about recruiting suggests that law schools agree with any
speech by recruiters. . . We have held that high school students can appreciate the difference
between speech a school sponsors and speech the school permits because legally required to
do so, pursuant to an equal access policy.").
93. See id. at 65.
94. Lamb's Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 387, 395
(1993); see also Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 274 n.14 (1981) ("In light of the large
number of groups meeting on campus, however, we doubt students could draw any reasonable
inference of University support from the mere fact of a campus meeting place.").
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view rooms are full, or the military recruiters decided for reasons of their
own that they would rather interview someplace else."5 Similarly, in
Prune Yard, no First Amendment violation was found where users were
not under the impression that the owner of the shopping center necessar-
ily shared the views of those who happened to be protesting at his
shopping center." In both cases, the Court analyzed the expectations of
users within these forums and found that users would not expect the ad-
ministrators of these forums to be responsible for the speech that passes
through these conduits.
From a user's perspective, the conduct an Internet access provider
engages in when facilitating the transmission of third-party content and
applications to its users is roughly analogous to the conduct at issue in
Rumsfeld and PruneYard. Consider that a user who encounters a slow or
inaccessible website or application has no way of knowing whether that
content is being slowed down or blocked by her Internet access provider,
or by some external cause or actor. A slowdown or blockage might be
caused by another entity's network congestion,7 by another entity's
(such as a government's or browser provider's) decision to block the
website, by the website provider's own lack of funding to maintain the
site, or, finally, by the website provider's explicit decision not to transmit
content at that time and location." But the user will typically have no
way of knowing which of these causes or actors to blame for the site's
inaccessibility. Because the blockage of a site does not inherently ex-
press an Internet access provider's disapproval of that site to users, and
because access providers can only make their expression manifest to us-
ers by separately providing speech that explains their conduct, the
blockage or degradation of the speed of a website will not typically con-
stitute expressive conduct.9
Nor do users typically understand an access provider to be commu-
nicating a message through its passive transmission of informational
95. Rumsfeld, 547 U.S. at 66 (emphasis added).
96. PruneYard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 87 (1980) ("It is instead a busi-
ness establishment that is open to the public to come and go as they please. The views
expressed by members of the public in passing out pamphlets or seeking signatures for a peti-
tion thus will not likely be identified with those of the owner.")
97. Internet packets must pass through a wide variety of external routers between origin
and destination. See supra Part II.A.
98. See, e.g., YouTube and the Rise of Geolocational Filtering, OPENNET INITIATIVE
(Mar. 13, 2008), http://opennet.net/blog/2008/03/youtube-and-rise-geolocational-filtering
(discussing tools used by Google and other website providers to block or limit video content
in specific locations).
99. See Runsfeld, 547 U.S. at 66 ("An observer who sees military recruiters interview-
ing away from the law school has no way of knowing whether the law school is expressing its
disapproval of the military, all the law school's interview rooms are full, or the military re-
cruiters decided for reasons of their own that they would rather interview someplace else.").
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content, even when that content is fraught with strong ideological or
moral expression. A user does not in any sense view the cable provider
RCN (or any other Internet access provider) as speaking, making, edit-
ing, performing, endorsing, or even acquiescing to the content delivered
through an Internet connection that happens to be provided by RCN.
Rather, users view their Internet access provider as a neutral gateway to
the open and unfiltered Internet-an impression that is affirmed by the
advertising materials of the providers themselves.'" Thus, users of Inter-
net access providers do not treat the provision of a site as a value
judgment made upon that site by their access provider."o Rather, users
understand the provision of Internet access as a gateway to a forum
where content providers, application providers, and other users are free
"to come and go as they please."0 2
In Turner, the Supreme Court found that based on "cable's long his-
tory of serving as a conduit for broadcast signals," there was "little risk
that cable viewers would assume that the broadcast stations carried on a
cable system convey ideas or messages endorsed by the cable opera-
tor."0 3 While this "risk" is already minimal in the context of cable, it is
even more attenuated in the context of the Internet, where access provid-
ers engage in little if any of the content cultivation and programming
engaged in by cable operators and broadcasters. '? Responsibility, both
legal and ethical, falls on the originator or end user of the content.
100. See, e.g., High Speed Internet-Optimization, RCN (May 24, 2008),
http://web.archive.org/webl20080524060125/http://www.rcn.com/internet/highspeed/optimiza
tion.php (accessed by searching for RCN in the Internet Archive index) (claiming that the
RCN network is built "so you can enjoy the Internet the way it was intended to be-fast and
uncapped"). RCN has removed this statement from its website.
101. Indeed, the user may be entirely unaware of the role played by the access provider
in delivering content, and may think of the browser (Firefox, Internet Explorer, Safari,
Chrome, etc.) or even the operating system (Mac OS X, Windows, Linux, Android, etc.) as
the relevant unit of content-delivery.
102. PruneYard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 87 (1980).
103. Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 655 (1994).
104. The absence of any user assumption that Internet access providers speak or endorse
the content and applications that flow through their conduits is further demonstrated by the
fact that users (as well as courts, see infra Part IV.B.2) tend not to hold even information in-
termediaries-such as platform proprietors (Facebook, Myspace, Twitter, YouTube, etc.),
search aggregators (Google, Yahoo!, Bing, etc.), and communication facilitators (Skype,
Vonage, AOL Instant Messenger)-responsible for the information conveyed on their ser-
vices, let alone the network intermediaries through which users access these platforms,
aggregators, and facilitators. Speech rights may accrue to some of these former information
intermediaries as a result of their careful aggregation, arrangement, and management of the
information that flows through their platforms. However, a clear distinction remains in place
between an information aggregator or second-order platform such as Facebook and a commu-
nications transportation mechanism such as an Internet access provider, with no speech rights
accruing to the latter, non-expressive actor.
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The conduct of Internet access providers in routing third-party con-
tent and applications to users is thus highly unlikely to be understood by
users as the articulation of an access provider's "message." As in Rums-
feld, nothing about either the provision and functionality of Internet
access or the nature of subscribers' understanding of Internet access sug-
gests, in any consistent or fundamental way, that Internet access
providers agree with the speech, messages, and information provided by
external content and application providers. Because a decentralized
communications network such as the Internet is "repeatedly . . . used by
a wide variety of private organizations," there is no danger that users of
the network would think that the owners of the network's conduits are
endorsing the speech of those private organizations." Users have proven
adept at distinguishing between speech that an Internet access provider
sponsors and speech that an Internet access provider simply transports.'
Users simply do not understand the views of Internet access providers to
be somehow embedded in the third-party content and applications trans-
ported by these access providers to users."" Courts would be unlikely to
protect these routing and transmission activities under the First Amend-
ment.
IV. SEPARATING OUT THE SPEECH OF INTERNET
ACCESS PROVIDERS FROM THE SPEECH OF
CONTENT, APPLICATION, AND SERVICE PROVIDERS
Beyond the technological infrastructure of the Internet as a medium
for transporting third-party content and speech'" and the question of
whether subscribers perceive Internet access providers to be responsible
for the third-party speech they transmit,'" the compelled speech doctrine
also requires an examination of whether the owner of a platform on
105. See Lamb's Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 387, 395
(1993).
106. Internet access providers can be analogized to schools with respect to the ease by
which "users" of these different kinds of access providers can distinguish (a) speech spon-
sored by the provider from (b) speech that merely flows through the provider's facilities. See
Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic & Inst'l Rights, Inc., 547 U.S. 47, 65 (2006) ("[High
school students can appreciate the difference between speech a school sponsors and speech
the school permits because legally required to do so, pursuant to an equal access policy.").
107. As discussed supra in note 100 and accompanying text, this characterization of
Internet access as the provision of a neutral access conduit or transportation gateway to the
wider Internet also reflects the dominant way in which Internet access providers themselves
characterize their services, both in marketing materials and in earnings calls, to the general
public-through references to unfettered, unimpeded, uninterrupted, and/or unrestricted ac-
cess to the entire Internet or World Wide Web.
108. See supra Part II.
109. See supra Part Ill.
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which others are speaking has the opportunity to expressly disavow con-
nection with the speech and ideas of these third-party content
providers."" The following section considers the variety of mechanisms
that Internet access providers have at their disposal in order to differenti-
ate their speech from third-party content providers-and vice versa.
A. Internet Access Providers Have the Ability and
Numerous Practical Opportunities to Disclaim Affiliation
with the Speech of Third-Party Content and Application Providers
The forum owner's ability to disclaim association with the speech of
those using the forum was the second analytical point in the Supreme
Court's holding in PruneYard Shopping Center v. Robins. In PruneYard,
a shopping mall owner was able to "expressly disavow any connection
with the message [of protestors] by simply posting signs in the area
where the speakers or handbillers stand.""' This ability to "disclaim any
sponsorship" of a message generated by other content providers mili-
tated against a finding that the owner would be understood to have
expressed that message."2 The Court built on this finding in Turner,
where the existence of a "common practice for broadcasters to disclaim
any identity of viewpoint between the management and the speakers who
use the broadcast facility" augured against a finding that the speech of
broadcasters would be unlawfully compelled by the must-carry rules at
issue."' The Court continued to invoke this line of reasoning in Rums-
feld), where it noted that plaintiff law schools would "remain free under
the statute to express whatever views they may have on the military's
congressionally mandated employment policy."" 4 In contrast, the corre-
sponding absence of any "customary practice" within parades, "whereby
private sponsors disavow 'any identity of viewpoint,'" led the Court in
Hurley to hold that requiring the parades to include messages from all
comers would violate the organizers' First Amendment rights."'
The FCC's proposed nondiscrimination rules bear more similarities
to the laws and regulations upheld in PruneYard, Turner, and Rumsfeld.
The FCC's rules (a) require only neutral access, (b) do not force Internet
access providers to carry a governmental message, and (c) continue to
110. See PruneYard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 87 (1980).
I11. PruneYard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 87 (1980).
112. Id.
113. Turner Broad. Sys. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 655 (1994).
114. Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic & Inst'l Rights, Inc., 547 U.S. 47, 60 (2006)
(noting that law schools "could put signs on the bulletin board next to the door, . . . could
engage in speech, [and] could help organize student protests" in response to the obligation to
allow military recruiters to enter their campus).
115. Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Grp. of Bos., 515 U.S. 557, 576-77
(1995).
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permit express disavowal of endorsement by the access provider."'6 There
exist numerous opportunities and forums through which an Internet pro-
vider can distinguish its speech from speech provided by external parties
and disclaim affiliation with the views or messages contained in the
speech it carries to subscribers. The existence of these opportunities pro-
vides further evidence that an Internet access provider would not be
deemed to be the speaker of the third-party content and applications that
it routes to its users.
There is nothing about the FCC's proposed regulations, for instance,
that restricts what Internet access providers may say about the policies
and practices of the content and applications that they route to their users
(or, for that matter, about the policies of the government requiring them
to transport this data to users in a nondiscriminatory fashion), just as
there was "nothing in the Solomon Amendment [that] restricts what the
law schools may say about the military's policies.""' If AT&T or another
broadband provider sought to disclaim any association between itself
and the packets it transmits, it would be able to do so through an an-
nouncement on its own website portal"" and on a variety of other
affiliated websites. It would also be perfectly within the rights of provid-
ers to include a notice on a billing statement or in another piece of direct
mail or email to its subscribers disclaiming affiliation or approval with
the content of the packets transmitted over its networks." 9 Furthermore,
an access provider could place an identifying logo somewhere on con-
tent and applications that it has created or is otherwise responsible for,
distinguishing in-house content and applications from that generated by
external providers. Viewers would come to understand the absence of
such a logo as an indication that an external party had generated the con-
tent or application.
116. See PruneYard, 447 U.S. at 86. To some degree, Internet access providers open
their networks to the public and thus serve as a conduit for public speech in a manner analo-
gous to the proprietors of the shopping mall in PruneYard, who were found to run "a business
establishment that is open to the public to come and go as they please." Id. at 87. In addition,
they have benefited from heavy governmental investment in the provision of Internet access
services, including grants of rights of way, licensing and franchising access (rather than open
or unlicensed access), spectrum allocation, universal service funding, and other grants. These
federal investments and subsidies imply some corresponding ability to control how providers
manage access. However, it should be noted that the fact of federal provision of services was
not a necessary condition to the rejection of First Amendment claims in Rumsfeld, 547 U.S. at
61.
117. Rumsfeld, 547 U.S. at 65.
118. See, e.g., ATT.NET HOME, http://att.my.yahoo.com/ (last visited Nov. 16, 2010). The
website is currently operated under the Yahoo! domain.
119. See Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Pub. Util. Comm'n, 475 U.S. 1, 8 (1986) (holding that
appellant's delivery of a newsletter containing political editorials in the same envelope as its
billing statement "receives the full protection of the First Amendment").
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Notably, the fact that Internet access providers for the most part do
not issue such disclaimers, despite a clear option to do so, may indicate
that both access providers and users are unlikely to assume that the
views of third-party content and application providers would "be identi-
fied with those of the owner" granting these parties access to its
routers.120
B. Internet Access Providers' Role as a Transportation Conduit Through
Which Users Gain Access to the Larger World of Third-Party Content
and Applications on the Open Internet Is Easily Distinguishable from
Situations in Which Internet Providers are Originators of Content
The FCC's proposed nondiscrimination rules are consistent with a
recognition that access providers may become direct information provid-
ers in contexts where they explicitly create, aggregate, and organize
content for their users. Through use of the labels "Internet access pro-
viders" and "Internet connectivity providers" (as opposed to information
or content providers), the FCC has signaled a willingness to treat provid-
ers with a bifurcated set of rules depending on whether they are
positioning themselves as conduits through which users may gain access
to the open Internet, or as providers of specific content-driven services to
those users.121 Where an access provider also functions as an originator
of Internet packets, rather than as a router of packets to and from users,
that access provider is engaging in speech that is protectable under the
First Amendment and for which it can be found legally responsible.122
1. Actions as Content and Application Providers Are
Separately Regulable from Provision of a Basic
Telecommunications Conduit to Subscribers
A connectivity provider such as AT&T may occasionally transmit its
own in-house content over the Internet to all end users (not necessarily
just to subscribers).'23 In comments to the FCC, AT&T has pointed out
120. See PruneYard, 447 U.S. at 87 (holding that views expressed by speakers who are
granted a right of access to a shopping center would "not likely be identified with those of the
owner").
121. See Broadband Framework NOI at 7873 para. 16 (citing Cable Modem Declaratory
Ruling, 17 FCC Rcd. at 4804, paras. 16-18) (referencing prior Commission distinctions be-
tween "Internet connectivity" and applications provided through Internet access services such
as e-mail, newsgroups, and personal web pages).
122. See Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 637 (1994) (classifying a cable
provider as a First Amendment speaker to the extent that it engages in "original program-
ming"); FCC v. Midwest Video Corp., 440 U.S. 689, 707 (1979) (noting that a cable provider
may gain speech rights through exercising "a significant amount of editorial discretion regard-
ing what their programming will include").
123. See AT&T NPRM Comments, supra note 19, at 236 n.517.
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that it "owns and provides a wide variety of Internet content that is avail-
able over its own and other service providers' networks," listing not only
its in-house sports and entertainment video programming 24 but also the
fact that "the default home page for AT&T's wireline Internet access ser-
vice is 'powered by Yahoo!' and includes a variety of Yahoo!-provided
content, such as weather, sports, news, games, and video." 25 Based on
these service offerings, AT&T argues that it "clearly is a First Amend-
ment speaker in its capacities as an Internet service provider and content
provider."'2 6 AT&T further suggests that the codification of a nondis-
crimination rule by the FCC might prohibit AT&T from featuring its own
content in these ways, because "AT&T's selection of featured content
arguably involves 'discrimination' in favor of such content and against
content from other entities." 27 Verizon, too, suggests that broadband pro-
viders are "engag[ing] in speech by providing video programming to
their customers" that is increasingly "integrated with the Internet."28
Certainly, broadband access providers often intermingle basic tele-
communications transport offerings with enhanced data-processing
services that may be unique to the Internet access provider's network.2
Yet there is no language in the FCC's proposed rules barring a company
that acts as an Internet access provider from making content, applica-
tions, and other communications available in separate contexts. For
instance, the FCC's proposed rules would not necessarily bar entities
that function as Internet access providers from hosting their own web-
sites or from making available their own content offerings over the
Internet, so long as no preferential treatment is bestowed on these offer-
ings and no discriminatory treatment is imposed on unaffiliated offerings
(either in terms of higher prices or degraded quality). Nor would the
proposed regulations bar AT&T from offering various email and web-
hosting services as part of the Internet access package it makes available
to subscribers-again, so long as it did not discriminate against the email
and web-hosting services available from Internet businesses unaffiliated
with AT&T.
124. AT&T U-VERSE ONLINE, http://entertainment.att.net/tv (last visited Dec. 8, 2010);
AT&T FAN ZONE, http://fanzone.att.net (last visited Dec. 8, 2010).
125. Id. at 236 n.517.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Verizon NOI Comments, supra note 24, at 112.
129. Verizon's FiOS service is one example, insofar as Verizon delivers television ser-
vices over the same fiber link that its Internet subscribers use to access the Internet. The FCC
specifically suggests that some services such as "IP-enabled 'cable television' " are delivered
"over the same facilities as broadband Internet access service, but may not themselves be an
Internet access service and instead may be classified as distinct managed or specialized ser-
vices" not subject to the proposed regulations. Open Internet NPRM, supra note 1, at 13104
para. 108.
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Further, despite some measure of integration, it remains possible to
distinguish "managed services," such as subscriber-only video and tele-
vision programming and the "Yahoo!-provided content" referred to by
AT&T, from "Internet services," such as the basic routing and transport
of data, information, content, and applications back and forth from a
third-party provider to a user.30 Various factors can be used in making
this distinction between basic Internet service and separate managed ser-
vices. These factors include:
* Whether traffic on the service is identified and routed using
TCP/IP or some other protocol;
* Whether content and applications are portable across multiple
devices, networks, and architectures;
* Whether a particular service is held out to consumers as
Internet service or as a managed service separate from the rest
of the generalized Internet;
* Whether a service is unique to the access provider's network
or is common to all Internet users;
* What users' expectations are regarding the breadth of access
offered by the service; and
* How users actually experience and use the service.
Even in cases where an Internet access provider has entered into
deals with content providers such as Disney or ESPN, the provider typi-
cally demarcates such service offerings from its provision of basic
Internet access."' These special services-also offered by providers such
as Comcast, AT&T, and Verizon-are easily distinguishable and delim-
ited from the providers' basic offering of unfettered Internet access,m
which all providers list first on their customer-facing websites before any
mention of special services. Furthermore, Internet access providers typi-
130. For instance, although a broadband provider may offer a variety of specialized
adjunct services-ranging from security capabilities and domain name lookup to more ad-
vanced services such as website caching-these services primarily facilitate the provider's
basic transportation and telecommunications services, much as directory assistance services
can be considered adjunct to basic telephone service. See Reply Comments of Nicholas Bram-
ble, supra note 13, at 6-8 (describing potential uses of the adjunct-to-basic designation in the
context of Internet connectivity).
131. See, e.g., High Speed Internet, RCN, http://www.rcn.com/new-york/high-speed-
internet (last visited Apr. 20, 2010) (listing provision of "Fiber-Optic Internet Speeds" sepa-
rately from "special access" to services such as ESPN360.com and Disney Connection).
132. See Reply Comments of Nicholas Bramble, FCC Further Inquiry, GN Docket No.
09-191, at 2 (Nov. 4, 2010) (arguing that "specialized services" are services that either
"(a) cannot be offered over the best-efforts Internet ... due to performance or reliability re-
quirements or (b) do not involve two-way transmission of user-requested information").
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cally do not compete on special content offerings (outside of the differ-
ent "triple play" context, where providers offer affiliated-but not
integrated-television and telephone plans),' nor do they distinguish
within their own array of Internet access options based on the presence
or absence of special content offerings. That is, both among competitors
and within their own internal pricing plans, Internet access providers
differentiate service offerings based on speed and price of Internet ac-
cess, not specialized content. 3 4 Accordingly, there is a strong basis for
rejecting claims that Internet access providers have inextricably inter-
mingled their basic access offerings with managed service offerings. 35
Notably, the structure of Internet access service offerings stands in
stark contrast to the world of cable and satellite television offerings,
wherein different competitors strongly distinguish their subscription
plans based on content and programming availability. For instance, the
cable provider RCN has noted that surveys
confirm the vital importance of local sports programming to a
cable operator's success: the data show that some 40-58% of
cable subscribers would be less likely to subscribe to cable ser-
vice if it lacked local sports programming and, in one survey, an
additional 12% of subscribers said they were not sure whether
the absence of local sports programming would impact their de-
cision whether to take the service.36
133. See, e.g., Comcast Triple Play: Cable, Internet, and Phone Service, COMCAST,
http://www.comcast.com/Corporate/Learn/Bundles/bundles.html (last visited Nov. 16, 2010).
134. RCN, for instance, currently offers three high-speed Internet access options, distin-
guished only by speed and price. See Plans and Pricing, RCN, http://www.rcn.com/new-
york/high-speed-internet/services-and-pricing (last visited Apr. 20, 2010) (offering 1.5 Mbps
Internet for $16.99/month, 10 Mbps Internet for $26.99/month, and 20 Mbps Internet for
$51.99/month in New York, NY). From the webpage describing these three speed options,
one must click on a separate, smaller box marked "Included Features" in order to compare
associated content offerings; a click on this box reveals that all three speed/price plans offer
the same exact set of content offerings. Similarly, Comcast lists four high-speed Internet ac-
cess options, again differentiated only along the parameters of speed and price. See Looking
for Products and Prices?, COMCAST, https://www.comcast.com/localization/localize.cspx
(accessed by using the address "1000 Campbell Ave, 06516," then selecting "Faster Internet")
(last visited Oct. 24, 2010) (offering 1.5 Mbps Internet for $26.95/month, 12 Mbps Internet
for $44.95/month, 16 Mbps Internet for $54.95/month, and 50 Mbps Internet for
$99.95/month in New Haven, CT).
135. Some providers have argued that the proposed rules "would make it per se unlawful
for broadband Internet access service providers to offer any content-differentiated service,"
such as "a 'family-friendly' service that would permit access only to online content that fits
this description." See Comments of Time Warner Cable Inc., Open Internet NPRM, supra
note 1, GN Docket No. 09-191, at 45 (Jan. 14, 2010), available at http://fjallfoss.fcc.gov/
ecfs/document/view?id=7020375997.
136. Petition of RCN Telecom Servs., Inc., to Deny Applications for Condition Consent,
Applications for Consent to the Transfer of Control of Licenses by Comcast and AT&T, MB
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The presence or absence of sports programming is thus a primary selling
point for a cable provider; RCN concluded that a provider lacking this
variety of programming "will have little or no chance of winning as sub-
scribers as much as 40-70% of its potential customer base."'
A dual regulatory scheme of the sort outlined above is not unheard
of: for instance, cellular telephone service providers are regulated both
as common-carrier telecommunications services with respect to their
provision of basic phone access,' 8 and as information services with re-
spect to their provision of richer media and content-based services to
their wireless users.'13 This sort of bifurcated treatment for Internet ac-
cess providers is anticipated by statute,'"4 and Justice Scalia, too, has
argued that the activities of transporting and delivering content can be
separated out from the process of providing enhanced information ser-
141vices.
Accordingly, under a First Amendment analysis, it is both possible
and useful to differentiate the provision of basic Internet access from the
-142
provision of managed services.
Docket No. 02-70, at *31 (Apr. 29, 2002), available at http://fjallfoss.fcc.gov/ecfs/document/
view?id=6513188003.
137. Id.
138. See Reexamination of Roaming Obligations of Commercial Mobile Radio Serv.
Providers, 22 FCC Rcd. 15817 (2007) (order and further notice of proposed rulemaking)
(maintaining common carrier status for cellphone providers).
139. See Appropriate Regulatory Treatment for Broadband Access to the Internet over
Wireless Networks, 22 FCC Rcd. 5901 (2007) (declaratory ruling) (classifying wireless
broadband access provided by cellphone carriers as an information service).
140. See 47 U.S.C. § 153(44) (2006) ("A telecommunications carrier shall be treated as a
common carrier under this chapter only to the extent that it is engaged in providing telecom-
munications services.").
141. See Nat'l Cable & Telecomms. Ass'n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967,
1007 (2005) (Scalia, J., dissenting). In his dissent, Justice Scalia offered the following analogy
to support the notion that the provision of telecommunications services could be distinguished
from the provision of information services, even when offered by the same carrier:
If, for example, I call up a pizzeria and ask whether they offer delivery, both com-
mon sense and common "usage," would prevent them from answering: "No, we do
not offer delivery-but if you order a pizza from us, we'll bake it for you and then
bring it to your house." The logical response to this would be something on the or-
der of, "so, you do offer delivery." But our pizza-man may continue to deny the
obvious and explain, paraphrasing the FCC and the Court: "No, even though we
bring the pizza to your house, we are not actually 'offering' you delivery, because
the delivery that we provide to our end users is 'part and parcel' of our pizzeria-
pizza-at-home service and is 'integral to its other capabilities.' " Any reasonable
customer would conclude at that point that his interlocutor was either crazy or fol-
lowing some too-clever-by-half legal advice.
Id. (citations omitted).
142. To the extent that a managed service is offered independently of Internet access
(based on the six factors listed above), a rule regulating the provision of this managed service
would likely be subject to a level of intermediate scrutiny-similar to the scrutiny applied to
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2. Existing Legal Distinctions Between Content
Providers and Intermediaries
Following the FCC's decision in 2002 to classify high-speed cable
access providers as Title I-regulated information services and its 2005
decision to apply the same classification to DSL providers, 43 the for-
mal statutory basis for imposing Title II interconnection requirements
on telecommunications infrastructure providers fell away,'" and cable
and DSL providers were no longer under any obligation to open their
networks to third-party access providers. However, Comcast, AT&T,
Verizon, and other DSL and cable broadband services continue to func-
tion primarily as neutral conduits with respect to their routing and
delivery of information from application and content providers to
subscribers, and vice versa.145
This functional status as a neutral conduit is further demonstrated by
the fact that Internet access providers have continued to take advantage of
legal protections and immunities commonly granted to general-purpose
transportation services. Despite not operating as Title 1-regulated com-
mon carriers of telecommunications, access providers have nevertheless
frequently invoked and advocated for immunity from copyright and defa-
mation liability by positioning themselves as mere conduits or carriers of
content, rather than as expressive speakers or editors of that content.
They have distinguished themselves in this manner from cable operators
and newspaper publishers, who seldom if ever characterize themselves
laws regulating the provision of cable television service in Turner Broadcast Systems v. FCC,
512 U.S. 622,655 (1994).
143. Internet Over Cable Declaratory Ruling, 17 FCC Rcd. 4798 (2002). This classifica-
tion scheme was eventually upheld in Brand X 545 U.S. 967.
144. Title II of the Telecommunications Act of 1996 generally imposes three types of
regulations on providers of telecommunications services: § 201 bans "unjust or unreasonable"
rates or practices, § 202 prohibits "unjust or unreasonable discrimination," and § 208 struc-
tures the complaint process. Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. §§ 201-02, 208 (2006).
145. Indeed, Justice Scalia's dissenting opinion in Brand X makes clear that with
respect to their functionality as deliverers and neutral conduits of information, Internet
access providers can be subject to neutrality and nondiscrimination obligations. Brand X,
545 U.S. at 1005-06, 1014 (Scalia, A., dissenting) (arguing in dissent that cable-modem
service providers offer telecommunications to the public and are accordingly "subject to
Title II regulation as common carriers"). Where the "information" that an Internet access
provider transmits is facilitative of a communication between two external parties, and does
not add to that communication, then the access provider is functioning as a telecommunica-
tions service under Title II, not as an information service. See 47 U.S.C. § 153(50) (2006)
(defining "telecommunications" as "the transmission, between or among points specified by
the user, of information of the user's choosing, without change in the form or content of the
information as sent and received").
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as "neutral conduits" for information and applications provided by oth-
146ers.
For instance, § 230(c)(1) of the Communications Decency Act of
1996 ("CDA") provides that "[n]o provider or user of an interactive
computer service shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of any in-
formation provided by another information content provider." 4 7 Section
230 was effectively an effort to grant "interactive computer service[s]" (a
category under which Internet access providers fall) a common carrier-
style immunity from liability for the user-generated content they trans-
port through their networks, without at the same time burdening
providers with the full array of common carrier obligations.148
Analogously, in the copyright context, § 512(c)(1) of the Digital
Millennium Copyright Act ("DMCA") provides that "[a] service pro-
vider shall not be liable . . . for infringement of copyright by reason of
the storage at the direction of a user of material that resides on a system
"' ,49or network controlled or operated by or for the service provider ....
This legal principle that an Internet intermediary is "not a speaker" and
is to be distinguished from the publisher, speaker, or user of information
has taken firm hold and serves as a settled expectation around which a
thriving Internet economy and ecosystem has been built."o This expecta-
tion-along with the expectation of immunity created by § 230 of the
CDA-would be severely damaged by a judicial determination that
Internet access providers are in fact speakers, publishers, or editors of
the content that they transport on their networks.
The FCC's rules, on the other hand, would not disrupt these expecta-
tions, nor would they preclude the speech of Internet access providers in
their capacity as access providers-contrary to the contentions of Laur-
ence Tribe and Thomas Goldstein. Tribe and Goldstein argue that under
146. See, e.g., Turner, 512 U.S. at 653 (noting that broadcaster appellants "maintain that
the must-carry provisions trigger strict scrutiny because they compel cable operators to trans-
mit speech not of their choosing" (emphasis added)).
147. Communications Decency Act of 1996, 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1) (2006) (granting
interactive computer services immunity from defamation liability).
148. Compare id. (declining to condition service provider immunity on any prohibitions
on unjust or unreasonable discrimination), with Nat'l Ass'n of Regulatory Util. Comm'rs v.
FCC, 525 F.2d 630, 641-42 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (describing a "quid pro quo whereby a carrier
was made to bear a special burden of care, in exchange for the privilege of soliciting the pub-
lic's business").
149. Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(1) (2006).
150. See Mark A. Lemley, Rationalizing Internet Safe Harbors, 6 J. ON TELECOMM. &
HIGH TECH. L. 101, 101-02 (2007) ("Internet intermediaries-service providers, Web hosting
companies, Internet backbone providers, online marketplaces, and search engines-process
hundreds of millions of data transfers every day . . . . They can process and host that data
instantaneously only because they automate the process. . . . [1]f Internet intermediaries were
liable every time someone posted problematic content on the Internet, the resulting threat of
liability and effort at rights clearance would debilitate the Internet.")
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"net neutrality," three speech activities would be barred: a broadband
provider could not "refuse to carry certain content (because it was, for
example, offensive)," "speed its delivery of particular content to pre-
mium subscribers," and "limit the volume of data of a handful of
customers who interfere with others' access to the Internet by putting
tremendous strains on the network through massive file downloads."'
But the FCC's proposed rules clearly leave open the option for
Internet access providers to block various forms of categorically
unlawful content, and other forms of offensive content if requested to
do so by a user.'12 Certainly, as the FCC has recognized in its discus-
sion of proposed nondiscrimination rules, there exist clearly
established categories of content that access providers are legally-not
just morally-obligated to take down. These categories include child
pornography, material relevant to law enforcement and anti-terrorism
activities, copyright-infringing material if access providers have actual
knowledge of said material, and other categories of obscene or unlaw-
ful content.' For obvious reasons, a nondiscrimination rule would not
prevent Internet access providers from filtering, removing, or disclos-
ing these categories of content. Good Samaritan rules, too, enable
providers to "restrict access to or availability of material that the
provider or user considers to be obscene, lewd, lascivious, filthy, ex-
cessively violent, harassing, or otherwise objectionable" without
thereby sacrificing their immunity from intermediary liability under
§ 230 of the CDA.15 4 Moreover, Internet access providers will likely
also have the ability under the FCC's proposed rules to block "harmful
traffic" such as spam and malware and "traffic unwanted by users"
such as pornography.' It would be inaccurate to describe any of this
range of exclusionary activities as a form of speech by access provid-
ers. Instead, these activities are rightly characterized by the FCC and
others as elements of reasonable network management practices. '6
The latter two of Tribe and Goldstein's contentions-that the rules
would bar providers from managing their network in response to exces-
sive use by particular subscribers and from offering fast delivery to
premium subscribers-describe activities that either fall outside the
scope of First Amendment scrutiny or are not barred by the FCC's
151. See Tribe & Goldstein NPRM Comments, supra note 23, at 3.
152. See Open Internet NPRM, supra note 1, at 13114 para. 139 (proposing that access
providers "would not violate the [FCC's proposed Internet] principles in taking reasonable
steps to address unlawful conduct on the Internet" and could "reasonably prevent the transfer
of content that is unlawful").
153. Id. at 13114-16 paras. 139, 142-43, 145-46.
154. Communications Decency Act of 1996, 47 U.S.C. § 230(c) (2006).
155. Open Internet NPRM, supra note 1, at 13114 para. 138.
156. Id. at 13114 paras. 138-39.
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proposed rules. Existing and prior FCC rules have permitted the provider
of a basic transportation or telecommunication service to engage in net-
work management by "structur[ing] its communications network such
that the network efficiently functions as the basic building block upon
which it . . . can add computer facilities to perform myriad combinations
and permutations of information processing, data processing, process
control, and other enhanced services."' 7 There is no reason to expect that
the current proceedings would not result in allowances for similar forms
of network management. Similarly, a nondiscrimination rule would per-
mit metered pricing, as well as the capability to charge users more for
faster baseline access speeds-two practices that every Internet access
provider already engages in.
Courts are thus unlikely to view the activities of access providers as
sufficiently weighted with symbolic or expressive intent to merit protec-
tion under the First Amendment, because they are barred-by law in
some cases, and by expectation, tradition, and practice in others-from
making decisions about what content to include or exclude when serving
as a transportation conduit between users and third-party content and
application providers.
V. THE PAST AND FUTURE OF THE INTERNET
In the 1997 decision Reno v. ACLU, the Supreme Court described
the Internet as a "unique and wholly new medium of worldwide commu-
nication," replete with countless modern "town crier[s]" and
"pamphleteer[s]."' 59 However, the Court never clarified the constitutional
status of the conduct engaged in by the access providers who offer Inter-
net connectivity to these town criers, pamphleteers, and content
providers. Indeed, the opinion contains an overwhelmingly content-
driven analysis of the Internet, and little if any analysis of the underlying
communications infrastructure of the Internet. The Court placed primary
157. Second Computer Inquiry, 77 F.C.C.2d 384, 420 para. 96, modified on recon., 84
F.C.C.2d 50, modified on further recon., 84 F.C.C.2d 512 (1980), aff d sub nom. Computer &
Commc'ns Indus. Ass'n v. FCC, 693 F.2d 198 (D.C. Cir. 1982), aff d on second further re-
con., 56 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 301, 1984 FCC Lexis 2809 (May 4, 1984).
158. As to the question of premium content channels offered by providers, such services
can be differentiated from Internet access and connectivity, and evaluated on separate First
Amendment grounds. See Verizon-Google Legislative Framework Proposal, supra note 71.
See supra Part IV.B for a more detailed discussion of constitutional distinctions between the
offer of Internet access and the offer of managed services.
159. Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 850, 870 (1997); see also Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v.
FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 657 (1994)) (recognizing that the Internet presents an exemption from the
rationale typically given by courts to uphold governmental regulation of "physical control of a
critical pathway of communication").
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emphasis on Internet users, not Internet access providers, as speakers,
and did not reach the question of what protection, if any, the First
Amendment might provide owners of the telecommunications infrastruc-
ture.'6
The only reference to Internet access providers in Reno is a brief
note that "[ilndividuals can obtain access to the Internet from many dif-
ferent sources."'"' When the Court considered who might be the speakers
and "publishers" of information on the Internet, it focused on users, not
network providers:
Any person or organization with a computer connected to the
Internet can "publish" information. Publishers include govern-
ment agencies, educational institutions, commercial entities,
advocacy groups, and individuals. Publishers may either make
their material available to the entire pool of Internet users, or
confine access to a selected group, such as those willing to pay
for the privilege.62
Nowhere does the Court suggest that the provision of connectivity,
transport services, or underlying infrastructure to these publishers might
itself be an expressive activity. The focus is instead on those who are
actually creating and producing information, not those who are transmit-
ting it from one network node to another.
Additionally, if the First Amendment status of access providers re-
mained unclear at the time of the decision issued in Reno, it should be
clearer today. The Internet has evolved away from the integrated network
and information services once provided by Prodigy, America Online, the
Microsoft Network, and CompuServe. In 1997, the Supreme Court de-
scribed these walled-garden networks as "online services" that "offer
access to their own extensive proprietary networks as well as a link to
the much larger resources of the Internet."6- The Court then described
160. See Reno, 521 U.S. at 844.
161. Id. at 850 (noting the existence of service providers such as America Online,
CompuServe, the Microsoft Network, and Prodigy through which users gain access both to
"extensive proprietary networks as well as a link to the much larger resources of the Inter-
net").
162. Id. at 853.
163. Id. at 850. Prodigy, America Online, and other walled-garden services were
themselves not "Internet access providers" in the sense that Verizon, AT&T, and Comcast
are today; rather, these early networks were services into which users could dial with their
general-purpose phone lines, often simply by making a local call. But because the providers
of the general-purpose phone lines were subject to Title II common carrier obligations under
the Telecommunications Act of 1996, they were banned from charging additional fees or
imposing differential access and speed obligations to users of these dialup services. Prodigy,
America Online, the Microsoft Network, and CompuServe likely could not have taken the
form they did, were it not for a general-purpose telecommunications platform that enabled
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the Internet as a "vast library . . . and a sprawling mall offering goods
and services."'6 These metaphors would seem to presume some cura-
torial or editorial role to be played by those who grant access to the
Internet's wealth of information and users, which accurately reflects the
role played by early online services such as Prodigy and America
Online. But since the issuance of Reno in 1997, the Web has grown far
more "vast" and "sprawling," to the point that it is no longer feasible to
use enclosed spatial metaphors to describe the startling diversity of us-
ers, curators, aggregators, content providers, search providers, and
application makers on the open Internet.1
users to access these independent services on a nondiscriminatory basis. No additional fees
were charged either to users themselves or to the Internet companies that enabled these users
to "dial into" the Intemet.
164. Id. at 853.
165. The falloff of Prodigy, America Online, and CompuServe indicates that the for-
merly dual role of access providers-as both creators of and conduits for content-has been
replaced by a core functionality of providing generalized access to the wealth of content and
applications on the Internet. Rather than competing on programming and content offerings,
access providers increasingly compete along the more singular dimensions of speed of service
and breadth of geographic coverage. Although many continue to offer email and website-
hosting services to customers, even these services are fairly indistinguishable in character
from one another, and are not at the heart of the service provider's marketing efforts to con-
sumers. See supra text accompanying notes 130-31. Additionally, as noted above, § 230 of the
CDA, 47 U.S.C. § 230 (2006), and § 512 of the DMCA, 17 U.S.C. § 512 (2006), exempt these
carriers from various forms of tort and copyright liability for the communications they trans-
port, and thus further disincentive the carriers from acting as speakers or editors of the content
they carry. See supra Part IV.B.2.
While the 1990s trend towards vertical integration of dialup Internet access services with
content services has largely disappeared, some of the most popular applications and devices
associated with higher-layer content and communications platforms increasingly share charac-
teristics with those earlier "walled garden" services. See, e.g., JONATHAN ZITTRAIN, THE
FUTURE OF THE INTERNET AND HOW To STOP IT 101-02 (2008) ("In a development reminis-
cent of the old days of AOL and CompuServe, it is increasingly possible to use a PC as a mere
dumb terminal to access Web sites with interactivity but with little room for tinkering."); Chris
Anderson, The Web Is Dead. Long Live the Internet, WIRED, Sept. 2010, at 118, 118 (describ-
ing a "shift[] in the digital world ... from the wide-open Web to semiclosed platforms that
use the Internet for transport but not the browser for display," and noting that this shift is
driven "by the rise of the iPhone model of mobile computing, and it's a world Google can't
crawl, one where HTML doesn't rule"); Tim Berners-Lee, Long Live the Web: A Callfor Con-
tinued Open Standards and Neutrality, Sci. AM., Dec. 2010, at 80, 82 (decrying the rise of
proprietary applications such as Apple iTunes and magazine apps for smartphones that give "a
restricted subset of the Web" and prohibit links to and from the rest of the Web); Ryan Singel,
How Facebook Could Beat Google to Win the Net, WIRED: EPICENTER BLOG (Nov. 13, 2010),
http://www.wired.comlepicenter/2010/1 1/google-fears-facebook ("[Facebook] has become a
decent-sized replica of the Web inside the Web. And Google can't crawl and analyze much of
what happens in there."). Although such services generally fall outside the scope of this Arti-
cle, it is worth pointing out that this new manifestation of enclosure at a higher layer is, in at
least two senses, qualitatively different from earlier walled-garden services. First, applications
on Facebook, the iPhone, and other platforms will likely continue to rely on a nondiscrimina-
tory Intemet architecture to transport datagrams to and from users without interference from
lower-layer connectivity providers. Second, so long as lower layers of the Internet's architec-
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Instead of the enclosed and centralized architecture associated with a
cable broadcast network, a newspaper publishing house, or even the
early days of Prodigy and America Online, the Internet has developed
within a distributed architecture and layered network model.'" As de-
scribed earlier, the protocol suite underpinning the Internet constructs a
series of layers which enable the encapsulation and transportation of
user-created content and applications on the underlying logical and
physical infrastructure of the network. 67 This layered architecture en-
ables parties to develop content and applications without needing to
enter into agreements with the entities that comprise or control the un-
derlying logical and physical layers of the Internet. The logical and
physical layers of the network thus serve as a standardized platform for a
wide array of innovative content and applications-much of it developed
by decentralized users rather than managers of the network infrastruc-
ture.'16
Given this divided architecture and the openness to interconnection
with multiple networks, much of the diversity of thought and inquiry on
the Internet can be traced back not to a few centralized owners of the
physical components of networks but instead to millions of individual
and business users who cluster around particular nodes that interest
them-and then form peer communities or discussion and development
groups wherein they can determine for themselves how they will take up
particular topics or implement particular ideas.'69 Specific websites,
applications, and services then pool and aggregate these diverse
discussions so that they can be accessed through search engines or
common databases. The result, then, is a wealth of creative expression
on the Internet by users and aggregators who create content and build
ture have not been optimized for the delivery of one instance of a given type of application
over another, the competition among such applications will continue in a relatively undis-
torted manner and it will be up to users, rather than connectivity providers, to decide which of
these applications will thrive.
166. There are four primary functional layers in the architecture of the Internet: applica-
tion, transport, Internet, and link.
167. See supra Part il.A.I.
168. See Reply Comments of Nicholas Bramble, FCC Further Inquiry, supra note 132,
at 6-9 (addressing potential harms to user innovation if specialized service providers and
wireless providers were permitted to vitiate open Internet protections and exert greater man-
agement and control over the development of new services and applications).
169. See YOCHAI BENKLER, THE WEALTH OF NETWORKS: How SoCIAL PRODUCTION
TRANSFORMS MARKETS AND FREEDOM 168-69 (2006) ("What emerges in the networked in-
formation environment . . . will not be a system for low-quality amateur mimicry of existing
commercial products. What will emerge is space for much more expression, from diverse
sources and of diverse qualities."), available at http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/wealthof_
networks/MainPage; see also Brett M. Frischmann & Mark A. Lemley, Spillovers, 107
COLUM. L. REv. 257 (2007) (describing positive externalities and "spillover effects" resulting
from a layers-based Internet architecture).
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applications atop a core general-purpose network. The less creativity and
editorial expression engaged in at the underlying layers by the general-
purpose network provider, the more room for creativity and expression at
the layers closer to the user.1o
The regulatory challenge going forward, then, is to preserve the con-
ception of the Internet as a modular system built upon common
standards-where instead of needing to build one vertically integrated
system, providers at different layers "can construct smaller pieces of the
system, connect them at a defined interface and not have to worry about
what happens on the other side of the interface." 7 ' Rules of stability and
interoperability, including nondiscrimination rules of the sort proposed
by the FCC, provide assurance to content providers and application
makers that the information they solicit and distribute over the Internet
will be accessible by anyone with an Internet connection. Such rules also
170. For some, the result of this decentralization of creative expression and correspond-
ing development of edge-driven innovation is a different conception of the purposes of the
First Amendment. See, e.g., LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE VERSION 2.0 236 (2006) ("Relative
anonymity, decentralized distribution, multiple points of access, no necessary tie to geogra-
phy, no simple system to identify content, tools of encryption-all these features and
consequences of the Internet protocol make it difficult to control speech in cyberspace."),
available at http://pdf.codev2.cc/Lessig-Codev2.pdf; see also Neil Netanel, New Media in Old
Bottles? Barron's Contextual First Amendment and Copyright in the Digital Age, 76 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 952, 960 (2008) ("[For Benkler,] First Amendment goals are best served by
allowing peer communication to flourish and preventing the mass media from reasserting the
one-way hub-and-spoke model in the digital network arena. Radically distributed clusters of
inquiry, debate, and collective action make up the backbone of our system of free expression
in the digital age."). Instead of relying upon one-way broadcasters to provide the "diverse and
antagonistic" expressions upon which traditional First Amendment theories have relied, see,
e.g., Citizen Publ'g Co. v. United States, 394 U.S. 131, 139-40 (1969) ("[The First Amend-
ment] 'rests on the assumption that the widest possible dissemination of information from
diverse and antagonistic sources is essential to the welfare of the public, that a free press is a
condition of a free society.' " (quoting Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 20
(1945))), the Internet is seen to enable the solicitation of diverse views from a spillover-rich
environment without the need for centrally managed selection of which "programming" users
should receive, see Richard Posner, Introduction to the Becker-Posner Blog, BECKER-POSNER
BLOG (Dec. 5, 2004, 11:23 PM), http://www.becker-posner-blog.com/2004/12/introduction-to-
the-becker-posner-blog.html ("[Blogging] is a fresh and striking exemplification of Friedrich
Hayek's thesis that knowledge is widely distributed among people and that the challenge to
society is to create mechanisms for pooling that knowledge.").
171. Kevin Werbach, Higher Standards Regulation in the Network Age, 23 HARV. J.L. &
TECH. 179, 196 (2009). As the FCC has observed on multiple occasions: "[s]o far in the Inter-
net's history, the basic standards underlying the operation of the Internet have created the
equivalent of perfect competition . . . among applications and content . . . with a minimum
[ofJ interference by the network or platform owner." Open Internet NPRM, supra note 1, at
13085 para. 52 (citations omitted) (quoting Formal Complaint of Free Press & Pub. Knowl-
edge, 23 FCC Rcd. 13028, 13054 para. 45 (2008)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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enable the network effects on which a variety of social, user-driven, and
Web 2.0 applications depend.172
Accordingly, a decision to treat Internet access providers as neutral
carriers with respect to their transmission of content would not jeopard-
ize or erode any existing "journalistic discretion of broadcasters in the
coverage of public issues,"'07 given that Internet access providers do not
currently make such discretionary journalistic choices in determining
how to structure their carriage of content and applications developed by
others. The particular activity recognized to receive heightened First
Amendment protection in Reno was the development and aggregation of
content and applications, not the design of the underlying mechanisms
by which such content was delivered and transmitted.174 A regulation tar-
geted towards these mechanisms-rather than towards the content
itself-would not receive scrutiny under the First Amendment, particu-
larly where the regulation's impact on speech was found to be
* * 175minimal.
The FCC's proposed rule would enshrine a principle of equal access
analogous to that found in the Solomon Amendment, which required that
when schools "send e-mails or post notices on bulletin boards on an em-
ployer's behalf," they are equally obligated to "send e-mails and post
notices on behalf of the military." 76 In the context of Internet access, the
proposed regulation would ensure that when access providers route
"lawful content, applications, and services" to users on behalf of some
third-party information providers, they are also obligated to route lawful
content, applications, and services to users from all other information
172. One purpose of requiring general-purpose Internet access providers to offer nondis-
criminatory access to their subscribers is to ensure that different gateways and "on-ramps" to
accessing the Internet will all enable access to the same set of content and applications, thus
generating the largest possible user base for these services.
173. CBS v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 124 (1973).
174. Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 870 (1997). Although one District Court has ob-
served that "'[t]he press in its historic connotation comprehends every sort of publication
which affords a vehicle of information and opinion,' " Comcast Cablevision of Broward
County, Inc. v. Broward County, 124 F. Supp. 2d 685, 692 (S.D. Fla. 2000) (quoting Lovell v.
City of Griffin, 303 U.S. 444, 452 (1938)), courts generally resist from employing so broad a
conception of the "press" as to swallow up new technological modes for the creation and
distribution of content and applications. See, e.g., Denver Area Educ. Telecomms. Consor-
tium, Inc. v. FCC, 518 U.S. 727, 777 (1996) (Souter, J., concurring) ("In my own ignorance I
have to accept the real possibility that 'if we had to decide today . . . just what the First
Amendment should mean in cyberspace, . . . we would get it fundamentally wrong.' " (quot-
ing Lawrence Lessig, The Path of Cyberlaw, 104 YALE L.J. 1743, 1745 (1995))).
175. See IMS Health, Inc. v. Ayotte, 550 F.3d 42 (1st Cir. 2008), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct.
2864 (2009) (describing laws preventing the data-mining of patient prescription information
as "inoffensive to the core values of the First Amendment . . . because they principally regu-
late conduct and, to the extent that they regulate speech at all, that putative speech comprises
items of nugatory informational value").
176. Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic & Inst'1 Rights, Inc., 547 U.S. 47, 61 (2006).
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providers. In Rumsfeld, the Court rejected the schools' First Amendment
objections to this sort of equal access rule on both jurisprudential and
historical grounds. The Court noted that
[c]ompelling a law school that sends scheduling e-mails for
other recruiters to send one for a military recruiter is simply not
the same as forcing a student to pledge allegiance, or forcing a
Jehovah's Witness to display the motto "Live Free or Die," and it
trivializes the freedom protected in Barnette and Wooley to sug-
gest that it is."'
In short, the law schools in Rumsfeld were treated by the Court as a
general-purpose platform on which multiple users could exchange in-
formation, and this finding militated against the notion that the law
schools could invoke autonomous individual speech rights in the same
manner as traditional compelled-speech plaintiffs. First Amendment ob-
jections to a rule compelling general-purpose Internet access providers
to offer the same kind of nondiscriminatory access will likely trigger a
similar analysis.
CONCLUSION
A firm technological understanding of the Internet is in place; it
should not be dislodged through the discretionary introduction of a novel
theory of First Amendment interests into a domain where no speech oc-
curs. In Rumsfeld, the Court found that the selective activities engaged in
by hosts of recruiting events fell outside the scope of First Amendment
protection."' Notably, when compared to the relevant actors in Rumsfeld,
Internet access providers play a far less selective and far more attenuated
role with respect to the content and applications being transported
through their networks. Whereas a law school administrator must ana-
lyze a pool of potential recruiters and make a variety of content-based,
time-based, and space-based decisions as to which of these recruiters to
invite to campus and which to exclude, the expansive and evolving me-
177. Id. at 62. Compare id. (upholding law promoting equal access to recruiting ser-
vices), with Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705 (1977) (invalidating law requiring drivers to
carry certain state-approved messages on their license plates such as "Live Free or Die"), and
W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943) (invalidating law forcing school-
children to pledge allegiance to the flag). The Court in Rumsfeld noted that to find otherwise
would "plainly overstate[] the expressive nature of their activity and the impact of the [pro-
posed regulations] on it, while exaggerating the reach of . . . First Amendment precedents."
Rumsfeld, 547 U.S. at 70.
178. See Rumsfeld, 547 U.S. at 70 (finding a law "incidentally affect[ing] expression"
permissible under the First Amendment).
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dium of the Internet prevents an access provider from making these same
decisions. Internet access providers do not make any meaningful ongo-
ing editorial decisions as to which content to allow within their networks
and which to suppress.
The theory of strong First Amendment protection advanced by some
parties before the FCC fails to illuminate the debate over the proper
scope of reasonable network management. Not only does the proffered
analogy to other forms of speech fundamentally mischaracterize the na-
ture of the conduct associated with telecommunications technologies, it
also attempts to shut down this debate before it begins by suggesting that
any management or blocking of user and third-party content is per se
within the speech rights of the access provider to perform.
Courts determine whether an entity is engaged in speech or expres-
sive conduct based in part on a consideration of the content, context, and
medium of the relevant activities, and in part on the understanding of
those who view or receive the conduct as to whether they are viewing or
receiving a message. Based on an application of these factors to the ac-
tivities and conduct of Internet access providers, it is clear that such
providers do not engage in speech or expressive conduct with respect to
their provision of access to the worldwide Internet. Accordingly, the
nondiscrimination rule proposed by the FCC regulates neither the speech
nor expressive conduct of Internet access providers in a manner that is
cognizable for purposes of the First Amendment.
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